PREFACE

To be wholly fruitful, the study of Gandhi should be more than historical; it should be brought closer to our times and shown in relation to the needs and challenges of the nuclear age. This is one of the major preoccupations of the Gandhi Peace Foundation; and within limits, this is what the present book has attempted to do.

The limited first edition of the book was designed and produced as a presentation to Dr. R.R. Diwakar, Chairman of the Foundation, on his seventieth birthday. The present edition is a considerable revised and enlarged one, and is in many ways a more unified volume of studies. Some of the new material had first appeared in the pages of Gandhi Marg, the quarterly journal of the Foundation.

Our chief thanks are due to the many writers on Gandhian themes who have made this volume possible; they have been unstinting in their cooperation. We should also like to thank the Bhartiya Vidya Bhavan for collaborating with us in the publication of the book; and Smt. Meera Mahadevan for reading the proofs and compiling the index.

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INTRODUCTION

Is Gandhi relevant to the world of today?

This is the question that is uppermost in the minds of all thinking people who have learnt to set great store by the revolutionary ideas of Gandhi and this is the question that this book tries to explore, objectively and from a great many points of view.

The study of Gandhi is not merely the study of his life, work and ideas, it is also the daily evolving application of those ideas to new challenges and situations. In this book the careful reader will find much new ground being uncovered before his eyes and many incentives to new thinking.

If the burden of the book is that Gandhi is intensely relevant to our times, it makes this assertion not dogmatically but with the humility of scientific exploration.
THE RELEVANCE OF GANDHI (PROLOGUE)

R.R. Diwakar

The moment the mighty figure of Gandhi rises before us, the question presents itself: What is his relevance today and for the future? What inspiration can we draw from his life? What light can his thought and wisdom shed on our problems? How does his way of life affect our course of action in private and public affairs?

That Gandhi is relevant today and for centuries to come is not in doubt at all. The words which Jawaharlal Nehru uttered almost immediately after Gandhi’s sudden exit from this world are found to prove prophetic. He said, The light is gone and yet it will shine for a thousand years. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., the Nobel Peace Prize winner of U.S.A., came to India as a pilgrim in 1959. After a month’s sojourn in the land of Gandhi, on the eve of his departure, he was asked a cynical question at a press conference in Delhi. Where is Gandhi today? He was asked: we see him nowhere. Dr. King’s reply was that Gandhi was inevitable. If humanity is to progress, Gandhi is inescapable. He lived, thought and acted, inspired by the vision of a humanity evolving towards a world of peace and harmony. We may ignore him only at our own risk.

The relevance of a man or his message can be said to have many aspects. It can be immediate or remote; it can be local, regional or general; it can be personally relevant to some or universally for all. In the case of Gandhi all these aspects of his relevance can be studied with profit.

Man, in Gandhi’s eyes, was the measure. Gandhi’s approach to himself, and to life in general, was that of a seeker of truth and of a votary of nonviolence or love. His was a scientific mind and he sought for that law of life and being which would promote the common weal and help man to reach higher elevations of consciousness. He perceived that love, spelt as nonviolence in thought, word and deed, was the shortest cut to human progress and evolution, both individual and social. In his eyes, progressive nonviolence could express itself best through service, self-suffering and, if necessary, total sacrifice. His mind was always open, fresh and receptive to truth as he went on finding it from day to day by experience. For him, while his own consciousness was the laboratory for searching out the inner core of truth, human society was the field for social experiments which could lead to harmony and happiness. In whatever corner of the world he worked for the time being, the whole of humanity and its good were always present to him.

One very important aspect of his life adds measure significantly to what he thought and did. He lived day in and day out open to public view, as on a stage. He took the people and even his opponents into confidence not only in regard to his actions but even his motivations. The result is that none in history has left behind so much of documentation and direct evidence concerning everything he thought and did. Moreover, he himself has written so much and on every
conceivable subject that his writings are likely to run into fifty to sixty sumptuous volumes of five hundred pages each. All this material is proving very helpful in assessing Gandhi’s relevance both for the present and for the future.

It is impossible in a few brief pages to cover all the aspects of Gandhi’s life and teaching which are of relevance to our own times and environment. Here I shall merely draw the attention of the reader to three aspects of his life which are of the utmost importance.

The life-story of Gandhi as a man is of the greatest relevance to every human being who aspires to rise above the average level and lead a meaningful life, with the watchword, “From good to better daily self-surpassed”. Gandhi was not merely a moralist but one who believed that man has a great future and that he is evolving towards a higher and nobler destiny. He knew the power of the many vital and sensual urges of man. He has also confessed with remarkable frankness his own weaknesses in this matter. But what makes a study of his life most helpful is the unceasing attempt he makes to conquer these weaknesses and establish the superiority of moral and spiritual endeavour. Not one of us is free from the weaknesses our minds are subject to. At the same time, every one of us wishes to rise above the excessive demands of the flesh. This constant struggle goes on within us and we require not only inspiration and strength to win this inner battle but also some practical guidance to overcome our weaknesses. Gandhi is eminently fitted to be a good guide to us because he is extremely human and does not interpose any distance between himself and us by assuming an air of superiority or authority. He declared that what he had done, or was doing, every other human being was equally capable of doing. That self-control is the key to the higher and happier life was his constant refrain. His progress in this matter was not by a sudden conversion, or through the grace of some saint or seer or holy shrine. From and erring, faltering, stumbling and struggling youth, Gandhi rose to the eminence of being called “a moral genius” by no less a person than the celebrated British philosopher, C.E.M. Joad. This eminence he attained not by accident or luck or good fortune but by a determined and steady effort at self-discipline. His outer life and actions were but the reflection of his inner struggle to hold fast to truth, to truthful living, and to achieve good ends only through good, virtuous, nonviolent means. We can easily see what great importance he attached to self-control and personal virtue if we remember that he felt it necessary to take the vow of continence on the eve of launching the great campaign of satyagraha in South Africa. If one wishes to study a modern life, as in a film, a life which chastened itself from step to step and ultimately became the powerful force that raised a nation from utter slavery to dignified independence, one would have to go to Gandhi. There is something very intimate and personal, something very familiar and near in Gandhi’s life because it is so open and sincere. Not only his celebrated autobiography, but his enormous and multitudinous correspondence and even the editorial columns of the journals
which he edited for years and in which he always wrote in first person, all these reflect the process of his development from time to time. His every word, spoken or written, is like a link in the dialogue between his ego and his higher self. It exposes to view the springs of motivation and action and thus renders the greatest service to man evolving from the stage of animality to humanity, from untruth to truth, from darkness to light, from hatred to love, from selfishness to altruism, from man the beast to man the god, which is really what all men aspire to be.

What other life can be so relevant and helpful to all of us?

As one reads about the inner life of Gandhi one finds that his had been a heroic struggle against what he thought was mean, low and below the human level. His endeavour was to rise above the life of the senses and life the life of the spirit. That is why Tolstoy’s The Kingdom of Heaven is Within You appealed to him so immensely. He laid the greatest store by self-purification. The evil outside was, in his eyes, the reflection of the evil and weakness inside oneself. The inner and the outer world were but the obverse and reverse of the same coin, namely, our existence, our being. If the evil inside was to be fought and conquered, it was equally necessary for man to fight all evil outside with as much determination and bravery. While he was a saint and a holy man aspiring to be clean and pure, above all the temptations of the flesh and beyond any selfish motivation, and a true devotee of God or Truth, he was nevertheless a saint in constant action, an activist of the highest order. He was not satisfied with his own individual salvation. Like the compassionate Buddha, he was inspired by the passion for relieving every kind of suffering and for wiping out the last tear from the eyes of the last man. That is why his most favourite song and refrain was, “He alone is a true devotee of God who understands the pain and suffering of others.” His tireless striving to remove the sources of every kind of suffering arose out of this extreme sensitiveness to the pain of sentient beings, of course, including him.

The other equally important and powerful urge which hold of Gandhi’s whole being early in life was “to return good for evil”. He quotes in his autobiography a stray line from a Gujarati poet which he read in his boyhood. But to act according to this principle became a passion with him throughout his life.

Thus this triple passion—to search in a scientific spirit for the law of the individual and social well-being and progress, to establish the truth of that law through love and nonviolence, and always return good for evil—dominated his life from the beginning to end.

If Gandhi’s life, thought and action are extremely relevant and useful for every human being who is self-conscious and who aspired after a higher, nobler and more exalted life than he may be living today, Gandhi’s teaching as regards social life and its proper organization is equally positive, constructive and practical. In fact, he called himself a practical idealist. He did not even for a moment forget that man is essentially a social being. Man’s relationship to sentient beings and
man’s relationship to material things may be said to be the subjects of his incessant research during a long, eventful and multifaceted life. While the fundamental lines of his research, namely, the truth about the law of being and its search through love alone, were once for all decided, his mind was always open like that of a scientist to new discoveries. That is why we find so much freshness in the way he deals with ever new situations. Going along the path he had chalked out for himself, he arrived at a social philosophy which could be characterized as a synthesis between the needs, urges and aspirations of the individual and of the society of which the individual is an inseparable and indivisible part. He called it sarvodaya—the rise and well-being of all. While it is the duty and responsibility of society to plan for the fullest possible development of the best in every individual, it is equally necessary that the individual render back unto society what he, in fact, owes to society. Thus there has to be a balancing of rights and obligations between the individuals and the society which they compose. A society will be but an abstract concept if we do not think in terms of the individuals who form it. An individual is equally an abstract entity without a society to live in. Gandhi therefore gave the greatest importance to the flowering of the individual in a properly ordered society, and not merely to organization and systems. A chain is only as strong as its weakest link and a system is good and efficient only to the extent of the goodness and efficiency of the individuals working it. Gandhi applied these principles to all human organizations and systems, economic, political and social.

Man, the individual, is the centre of Gandhi’s system of thought. The objective is the moral and spiritual development of man. Man is primarily his consciousness, his capacity to be self-conscious, and his built-in potentiality to judge between good and evil, between what will help him in his evolution to higher levels of being and what will obstruct his path. This gives him a leverage, not only to aspire after higher levels but to endeavour to attain the same. Gandhi believed in this self-effort and the path he outlined lay through ethical, moral and spiritual disciplines. The key-note of his ethics is love, which means near-identity of interest with every sentient being; this love has to be expressed in the form of service and sacrifice. His ethics in relation to material things and property consisted in his concept of trusteeship. Every human being is a trustee not only of his faculties and attainments but of everything he comes by. And trusteeship consists not only in using his powers and goods properly but in using them selflessly and for the well-being of all others.

As indicated above, his social philosophy boils down to sarvodaya, which precludes the suppression or elimination of any class. But the question is how to bring about this millennium? The satyagraha way of life is his reply. Insistence on the truth of one’s own experience through nonviolence alone, even unto death, is the royal road he points out.
Gandhi saw that there was enough of truth, evil, injustice and exploitation in human relationships and public affairs. He was determined that all that must go. He wanted to devise ways and means which would be consistent with the principles he had laid down for himself as being the best. He was as heroic in fighting the evil and injustice in the world outside as in conquering the evil and weakness in his own mind. The means he adopted satisfied the double demand, namely, that they should be truthful and that they should be pure, moral and constructive. Thus, in a world where science and technology have put into the hand of those in possession of wealth, power and authority weapons of coercion and destruction beyond ordinary conception, Gandhi’s weapon of satyagraha is a boon. It can be used even by a single individual who has developed sufficient moral power by his own purity of thought and conduct.

The relevance of satyagraha, both as a way of life and as a weapon for evolutionary social change, need not now be in doubt when it is being used successfully by the Negroes in U.S.A. under the able guidance of Dr. Martin Luther King. Though its use in an international conflict has yet to be tried, one can hazard the statement that non-alignment, moral pressure by non-aligned powers, and the economic and other sanctions which the U.N.O. often thinks of are along the line of nonviolent resistance to evil and injustice. It may be said that Aldous Huxley, in his famous book Ends and Means, has made a very good case for nonviolent resistance by all those who suffer at the hands of modern governments which are armed to the teeth with the modern instruments of coercion, suppression and destruction. He says that it is the only remedy—and a very civilized moral remedy at that.

The third aspect of Gandhi’s teachings which can be taken note of here is his insistence on the resolution of all conflicts by peaceful means. He declared that war and violence never solve any problems. They create new ones and sow the seeds of future wars and the continuance of hatred. The appearance of nuclear weapons, the use of which involves total destruction, has made Gandhi’s plea doubly forceful and important if the future of humanity and its peaceful, orderly progress is our concern. The only way is to cease to war against each other and instead, use all our resources to war against the common enemies of man, namely, ignorance, poverty, disease and so on. We must devise means and provide ways to resolve conflicts through negotiation, mediation, arbitration and tribunals—in fact, by every other means than the use of weapons which necessarily involves the destruction of life and property. It does not need any argument to prove that this teaching of Gandhi is relevant so long as conflicts are sought to be resolved through the use of destructive weapons and missiles.

It is clear that Gandhi’s life, thought, teaching and action are ever relevant for all aspirants of the ethical and spiritual life. His principles and technique of satyagraha are highly efficacious instruments of peaceful economic, social and political change whenever and wherever it is required. His gospel of peaceful
means for resolving all conflicts is the only way to escape the disaster nuclear war. In its totality, Gandhi’s teaching is a highly inspiring one and serves as a signpost to humanity marching towards a better, happier and more harmonious world.

01. THE TRADITION OF NONVIOLENCE AND ITS UNDERLYING FORCES

By William Stuart Nelson

Between 2000 and 1000 B.C., when the Greeks were still nomads, the oldest religious writings in history appeared in India. They were the Vedas in which we find, what has been described as “the first outpourings of the human mind, the glow of poetry, the rapture of nature's loveliness and mystery”.

Following the Vedas came the ritualistic Brahmanas, the Laws of Manu, and the philosophical Upanisads. Then appeared the two great popular epics, the Mahabharata and the Ramayana, and, as a part of the former, the Bhagavad-Gita called by Wilhelm von Humboldt “the most beautiful, perhaps the only true philosophical song existing in any known language.”

From the beginning, amidst prayers, philosophical speculation, commandments, poetry and epics the idea of nonviolence was present. In the Bhagavad-Gita, ahimsa or nonviolence is a superior ethical virtue:

I foresee no good will come
From killing my own kindred in war.
Even though they slay me, I wish not to strike them.
How can we be happy, having slain our own kindred
Though they, with hearts deadened with avarice,
See not the evil that will come.

The Laws of Manu prescribe that he who would teach others for their well-being must be guided by ahimsa and use sweet and gentle speech towards them. From the Mahabharata comes the maxim that nonviolence is the greatest religion or duty.

Not only is nonviolence one of Hinduism’s cardinal virtues and its cosmic outlook generally, there are also present in it those other qualities of the human spirit which are inseparable from nonviolence. So in the Mahabharata abstention from injury to all creatures in thought, word and deed is admonished and kindness and generosity are called the permanent duties of the good. Enjoin the Laws of Manu: “Let him patiently hear hard words. Let him not insult anybody. Against an angry man let him not in return show anger. Let him bless when he is cursed.”

Throughout these thousands of years of scripture we find self-imposed suffering and the surrender of one's possessions to God, both of which we shall discover to be the invariable accompaniments of genuine nonviolence.
Ancient Hinduism followed the course of most religions and leaving behind its pristine years of pure worship, poetry, philosophic and ethical insight deteriorated into an inflexible cultus, other worldliness, and an hierarchical social order rigid in the extreme.

The great reform came with Gautama Buddha, five hundred years before Christ, who gave the world an early and extraordinarily great personal example of total commitment to the nonviolent way of life.

Breaking away from the ritualism of the Vedic religion he attacked the superstitions, ceremonial and priest-craft of popular religion and the related vested interests, metaphysics and theology, miracles and revelations, and everything related to the supernatural. He appealed to reason and experience. He emphasized ethics. Having thus described the Buddhist reformation, Nehru says of Buddha himself: “His whole approach comes like a breath of the fresh wind from the mountains after the stale air of metaphysical speculation”.5

What of value accrues from violence? The answer of Buddhism is, “…hatreds are not quenched by hatred. Nay rather... hatreds are quenched by love”.6 And victory can always be relied upon to breed hatred, for the conquered are naturally unhappy.

The speech of men must be under the same rule, for to use harsh language to those who have committed a sin is to strew salt upon the wound of the error.

Buddha taught:

A brother ought not intentionally
to destroy the life of any being.7

Not for our life would we ever intentionally
kill a living being.8

A truth-finder laying aside cudgel and sword,
lives a life of innocence and mercy....

He heals divisions and cements friendship; ...
for in peace is his delight...9

I have spoken of the total commitment of Buddha to the nonviolent way of life. Such a commitment must include a profound concern for the welfare of all. This indeed was a passion with Buddha. He preached to his disciples: “Go unto all lands and preach this gospel. Tell them that the poor and the lowly, the rich and the high, are all one, and that all castes unite in this religion as do the rivers of the sea.” 10

Live on,

for the good and the happiness of the great multitudes,
Out of pity for the world,
for the good and the gain and the weal of men.11

For Buddha, the outcasts were not of the traditional sort. He said:

The man who is angry and bears hatred,
who harms living beings, who speaks falsely,
who exalts himself and despises others—
let one know him as an outcast.  

The commitment to nonviolence involves also self-discipline and self-renunciation. 
Buddha rejected extreme asceticism and chose rather the Middle Path between self-
indulgence and self-mortification coupled with rigid self-discipline. “Not even a
God”, he said, “…could change into defeat the victory of a man who has vanquished
himself and always lives under restraint”. 

Having gained sixty disciples, he sent them on their way, with this message: “Go ye
now out of compassion for the world, for the welfare of gods and men. Let not two of
you go the same way. Preach the doctrine which is glorious. Proclaim a consummate,
perfect and pure life of holiness. 

If Buddha did not urge self-mortification, he did warn against the penalty of
selfishness. He taught: “People grieve from selfishness; perpetual cares kill
them”; 

The man who is possessed of much property
Who has gold and food,
And still enjoys his sweet things—
This is the cause of loss. 

Later Buddhism in many ways has been apostate to the teachings of its founder and
yet, departing from India after more than a thousand years, it has left an
ineffaceable mark upon the life and thought of this country.

In India when men speak of the two or three supremely great figures of their past,
King Asoka is always among them. He was called the Beloved of the Gods and his
reign an Indian historian describes as “one of the brightest interludes in the troubled
history of mankind”.

KING ASOKA AND BUDDHISM

Asoka, model of gentleness, succeeded to his father’s throne in 268 B.C. at the time
the Romans were reviving the Etruscan sport of setting slaves to fight each other for
their lives and only a few years before the first gladiatorial games were held in that
city. His kingdom was vast, including all of present India except the most southern
portion and great territories further north. He was a conqueror until his conversion.
Of this conversion Asoka himself tells us. Grieved by the suffering born of one of his
great victories, involving the deportation of 150,000 persons, the killing of 100,000
and the death of many times that number, he resolved upon forgiveness and
conciliation wherever possible and enjoined his ancestors not to seek new victories
and, should they become engaged in conquest by arms, to take pleasure in patience
and gentleness and to regard the only true conquest as that won by piety. Although
he did not renounce every use of force he undertook no war voluntarily, which led to
the great weakening of his kingdom.
The conversion of Asoka was a conversion from the law of conquest to the Law of Piety. What then was the Law of Piety? It was the law of good deeds, compassion, liberality, truthfulness and purity. And so throughout his vast kingdom he ordered the planting of banyan trees to provide shade for both men and beasts, the digging of wells, the providing of watering places, and the erecting of rest houses. He did not see fit to eliminate the death sentence but he ordered the novel rule—novel then and in some places novel now—that the condemned should have three days in which their relatives might come and meditate with them. Animals were not forgotten. Hospitals were erected for them, animal sacrifice was forbidden and restrictions were placed upon the slaughter of animals for food, thereby giving impetus to the practice of vegetarianism. Hunting was abolished. Asoka had not expressed faith in God and little enthusiasm for ceremonials. He complained at the trivial, worthless ceremonies performed by women at weddings, the birth of children, and upon departures on journeys and declared that it is the ceremonial of piety that bears great fruit. This ceremonial, he said, includes the proper treatment of slaves and servants, honour to teachers, gentleness towards living creatures, and liberality towards ascetics and brahmans.

It is to be recalled that Asoka was Buddhist and it is said that his missionaries went from his court as far west as Alexandria. But he was tolerant. Speaking of reverence he said: "....the root of it is restraint in speech, to wit, a man must not do reverence to his own sect or disparage that of another man without reason....because the sects of other people all deserve reverence for one reason or another.... By acting contrariwise, a man hurts his own sect and does disservice to the sects of other people."18

This was King Asoka of the third century B.C. Of him H. G. Wells wrote: “For eight and twenty years Asoka worked sanely for the real needs of men. Amidst the tens of thousands of names of monarchs that crowd the columns of history....the name of Asoka shines and shines almost alone, a star. From the Volga to Japan his name is still honored. China, Tibet and even India, though it has left his doctrine, preserve the tradition of his greatness. More men cherish his memory today than have ever heard the names of Constantine or Charlemagne.”19

**JAINISM AND BUDDHISM - THE SIMILARITIES**

It will be profitable in discussing Jainism to recall that Mahavira, its founder, was a contemporary of Buddha, that Jainism and Buddhism developed side by side in sixth century India, B.C., and that they bore important similarities. As was true with Buddhism, Jainism also broke away from the Vedic religion. Neither is concerned with first cause and in both the emphasis is strongly ethical rather than transcendental.

The departure of Jainism from Buddhism in practice was in part largely a matter of degree. Self-discipline in Jainism was carried to a great extreme. Gandhi's early years were spent in Gujarat, Western India, where Jainism was very strong and he and his family fell heavily under its influence.
Described as perhaps the finest ethical feature of Jainism is the year-end penance in which Jains, including both monks and laymen, “are expected to confess their sins, pay their debts, and ask forgiveness of their neighbours for any offences, whether intentional or unintentional”.20

As in Buddhism, Jainism reveals a strong social concern, the difference being largely in the motivation. In Buddhism, escape from the round of suffering was at least the original motive. Charity in Jainism is good for the soul which is enabled to break the bonds of matter. Thus, often, it is not for love of others but for the love of one’s own soul that good works should be performed. Later Jainism revealed a greater warmth and humanity.

As to certain more easily identifiable aspects of nonviolence, Jainism was of all religions in India their most fervent exponent. We read:

  All beings hate pains.
  Therefore one should not kill them.
  This is the quintessence of wisdom,
  not to kill anything.21

This doctrine has led to the most extraordinary practices, including the sweeping of paths as one walks along and the wearing of gauze over one’s mouth to avoid the accidental killing of any creature. Moreover, in the Jain view, a good rebirth or salvation cannot be achieved in violence against earth or water, for many souls are embodied in water and many creatures live in the earth.

Although ahimsa was emphasized as the greatest virtue in personal relations, warfare for Jains, as for most Indians, was legitimate and militarism was not strongly opposed. Practical astuteness in Jain thinking is revealed in the following observation: “The force of arms cannot do what peace does. If you can gain your desired end with sugar, why use poison?”22

JESUS - A PROPHET OF NON-VIOLENCE

The Sermon on the Mount, said Gandhi, “went straight to my heart”,23 and he records his delight in the verses which begin: “But I say unto you, that ye resist not evil: but whosoever smite thee on thy right cheek turn to him the other also.”24 Gandhi was not concerned with the exegesis of what he read, with amassing supporting scriptural passages, or with the defense of his interpretation against a contrary one. What he read went straight to his heart and that was sufficient. The reason for this is clear. What he read confirmed his own deepest insights.

The believer in nonviolence, however, will find numerous defenses of the interpretation of Jesus as a prophet of the nonviolent life. If the episode of Jesus casting the money-changers out of the temple with a “scourge of cords” has troubled him he will learn that the verb used for “driving out” or “casting out” is the same as that employed to describe sending away a cured leper and sending forth workers to the harvest. He will find support in one scholar who writes that the essence of what Jesus taught is distilled in the “Golden Rule”, and crystallized in the two great
commandments of “complete love of God, and unfailing love of one's neighbour. His blessing is for the peacemakers. He holds it to be nearer his own spirit to suffer than to inflict it, even when the suffering is undeserved. Instead of seeking revenge, he calls on his disciples to love their enemies and pray for those who persecute them....Finally his acceptance of the Cross was a summary in action of all that he had taught in word.”

A second New Testament scholar adds that “the ethical teaching of Jesus, according to any natural and straightforward exegesis, is obviously and flagrantly incompatible with intentional and organized bloodshed and therefore with war”.

The lives and convictions of the early Christians also afford convincing if not conclusive evidence that the intrinsic nature of the life and teachings of Jesus is persuasive testimony against violence and participation in violence. For more than two centuries Christians were preponderantly opposed to war, refusing to justify and to participate in it.

A church order as late as the third century required soldiers to abandon the calling of soldiering before baptism and provided for the excommunication of Christians who joined the army. About 150 years after Christ, Marcus Aurelius Antonius, pressed by the enemy, entreated Christians to join his forces and then threatened them only to be met by refusal “for the Cause and Names of their God, which they bear in their Consciences”. The answer of Martin to Julian the Apostate, 300 years after Christ, was, “I am a Soldier of Christ, therefore I cannot fight”.

Then followed the great tragedy—the wedding of the Christian Church to Rome. Says Cadoux of the great change: “Allowing for a little exaggeration, (it) is broadly speaking true” that “the Church as a whole definitely gave up her anti-military leanings, abandoned all her scruples, finally adopted the imperial point of view and treated the ethical problem involved as a closed question”.

At the time of the Protestant Reformation we see repeated a familiar historical pattern: revolt against long-established religious authority and practices accompanied by a vigorous assertion or reassertion of the nonviolent temper. Thus came John Hus and the Moravians, the Mennonites and the Schwenkfelders, and later George Fox and the Quakers.

The Quakers are well known to us and they are known not only for their consistent testimony against war but for their commitment to a total way of life which is the invariable accompaniment of genuine nonviolence. Whatever deviation from the nonviolent way there may have been among individual Quakers, the record testifies that “no regularly constituted body of the Society of Friends has ever made a declaration contrary to the strict pacifist position”.

When Howard Brinton describes the method of nonviolence in his Society, he includes the Quaker testimony and action against the horrors of seventeenth-century prison life which subjected these protesting Christians themselves to cruel suffering, for their pains. He described the long and painful effort of Quakers to have substituted for the inhuman treatment of the insane the ways of sympathy and
kindness. He quotes the admonition of George Fox to “Let your Light shine among Indians, the Blacks and the Whites that ye may answer the truth in them.” He records the program of Quaker relief of the distressed which began in 1690 during the Irish war when Quakers supplied war prisoners with food and clothing and which continues until this moment in the far and near places of the earth. And of course he describes the quiet, brave, novel and often fruitful labours of Quakers in the interest of international peace.

TOLSTOY AND NONVIOLENCE

Gandhi expresses himself as being overwhelmed upon reading Leo Tolstoy's The Kingdom of God is Within You and he called himself Tolstoy's humble follower. What did Gandhi find in this and others of Tolstoy's writing? He found, for one thing, that in Tolstoy's view a Christian is one who eschews violence, even avoids disputes with his neighbour and thus gains freedom for himself and helps to free the world. To the question as to whether those who resist nonviolently will be killed, Tolstoy answered, yes, but in numbers only a fraction of those who die in revolutionary wars.

In common with others who professed nonviolence Tolstoy was deeply offended by a religion of ecclesiasticism, of dogmas, of sacraments, fasts and prayers. Religion, he held, gave meaning to life, but the Church was an insult to his reason. “A life based on Christian truth was precious and indispensable to me, and the Church offered me rules completely at variance with the truth I loved.” He did believe in God. “I believe in God”, he confessed, “whom I understand as Spirit, as love, as the Source of all. I believe that He is in me and I in Him. I believe that the will of God is most clearly and intelligently expressed in the teaching of the man Jesus whom to consider God and to pray to, I consider the greatest blasphemy.” He also believed in faith, but a faith reconciled with reason. The result of Tolstoy's stricture against the Church was his excommunication. Tolstoy's was the first public funeral held in Russia without religious rites.

Protesting against mysticism and revelation of any type, Tolstoy expressed his profound faith in morality. “Religion”, he said, “is a certain relation established by man between his separate personality and the infinite universe of its Source. And morality is the ever-present guide to life which results from that relation.”

Tolstoy's nature was volcanic. Caught at the age of fifty-seven between the message of Christ and man's ways, he forsook the life of privilege, went barefoot, adopted plain attire, worked the fields at the side of peasants, forsook smoking, meat-eating, and hunting.

In Tolstoy the spirit of nonviolence found another logical expression, for he suffered with the suffering poor and strove with all his mighty energies to bring them relief. He petitioned the government to grant peasants an equal share with others, to forbid the disregard of Common Law, to remove all barriers to education, and remove all limitations on religious liberty. “A good deed”, he said, “does not consist merely of feeding the hungry with bread, but of loving both the hungry and the satisfied. For it
is more important to love than to feed, because one may feed and not love, but it is impossible to love and not to feed.”

Shortly, however, his diary carried the note: “I hardly slept all night. In the morning I said that this feeding the hungry is a serious matter.” The record shows that he plunged vigorously into the feeding of the famine sufferers.

It is obvious why Gandhi so willingly became Tolstoy's disciple and it is society's great fortune that Tolstoy found one who would bring to such magnificent flowering the seed he had sown.

THOREAU AND NON-VIOLENCE

United States Representative William H. Meyer of Vermont has opposed the draft of men into the armed services and expressed the non-conforming belief that Communist China should be a member of the United Nations. Apropos of this a columnist of the Washington Post has commented that such obedience to conscience is in the tradition of Thoreau who went to jail for his belief in the abolition of slavery.

In the first paragraph of his celebrated paper on “Civil Disobedience”, Thoreau protested against the United States’ war against Mexico. His more vigorous protest was the refusal to pay a tax in support of that war. He was thus seized and placed in jail. The story is told that Emerson visited Thoreau in his new quarters and inquired as to why he was there. The answer Thoreau is said to have given was, “Waldo, why are you not here?” As to Thoreau, Emerson was led to remark eloquently, “On him they could not calculate.”

In Thoreau we hear a familiar note. He was repelled by organized religion, “signed off” from the village church and refused to pay his tax for the support of the minister. He once lectured in an Amherst, New Hampshire, Orthodox church and later expressed the hope that thereby he had helped to undermine it. He had no creed, we are told, yet he himself said: “Happy the man who . . . lives a balanced life, acceptable to, nature and to God.” And Bronson Alcott, who knew him well, observed: “I should say he inspired love, if indeed the sentiment he awakens did not seem to partake of something yet purer, if that were possible, and as yet nameless from its rarity and excellence.”

In American history Thoreau’s two years’ sojourn alone in a cabin outside of Concord by Walden Pond is famous not that many understand fully Thoreau’s “clear-sighted view of a false economics and the perversion of values in American living”. Only now has the full significance of Walden been felt, says Henry Seidel Canby. For, he continues, “It is only in our generation that the industrial revolution has reached a point where man is in real danger of becoming a machine thinking like a machine. . . . And it is only in our own time that bodily comfort and the satisfactions of pride have been elevated into what is frankly called the American standard of living.”

Thoreau bore one further mark of the nonviolent spirit. His heart bled at the sight of injustice and all human suffering. His house was a station on the underground railroad.
and he himself escorted a fugitive slave enroute to Canada. The death of John Brown stirred him to the depths of his being. Speaking to a Concord audience on this man recently hanged, he said, “For once we are lifted out of the trivialness and dust of politics into the region of truth and manhood”; and “the only government that I recognize ... is that power that establishes justice in the land, never that which establishes injustice.”

Thoreau was not a pacifist. For him passive resistance was not enough where wrong was rampant. “I do not wish to kill or be killed”, he said, “but I foresee, circumstances in which both of these things would be by me unavoidable. In extremities I could even be killed.” And yet he would not kill a bird despite his scientific interests or even hold it in his hands..... “I would rather hold it in my affections”, he said.

Gandhi first read Thoreau's Civil Disobedience in prison. In reflecting upon this prison experience Gandhi quotes from Thoreau: “I say that if there was a wall of stone between me and my townsmen, there was a still more difficult one to climb or break through before they could get to be as free as I was. I did not feel for a moment confined, and the walls seemed a great waste of stone and mortar.” Upon reading Thoreau's Civil Disobedience Gandhi began to call his movement Civil Disobedience for English readers, instead of passive resistance. Later he adopted the phrase Civil Resistance.

GANDHI AND NONVIOLENCE

I hope that in this cursory, fragmentary survey of the nonviolent tradition certain unmistakable signs of the meaning and the underlying principles or forces of nonviolence have appeared. These forces I wish now to summarize and to examine in relation especially to the Gandhian philosophy of nonviolence.

First, the origin and support of the spirit of nonviolence in a people or a person has no single explanation. It may be given, that is, born of the culture of one's religious heritage, at the mother's knee. Gandhi's nonviolence was in gestation for three thousand years, at the least, here in the land of Hinduism, Buddhism and Jainism. Kaba Gandhi, his father, was a man who knew his mind and stood by it. His mother could “take the hardest vows” without flinching.

Again nonviolence is sometimes born of an extremity, of one's own suffering or the sufferings of others. King Asoka could not bear the horror on the battle field of Kalinga and he was reborn. Gandhi could not bear the insults inflicted upon himself and upon his fellow dark-skinned people in South Africa and he began the search for an answer. This search ended in a religion of truth and nonviolence.

Whatever the origin of nonviolence it must be supported by reason. The Buddhist saw clearly that victory by force breeds hatred, for the conquered is always unhappy. Gandhi was inspired by the great tradition of ahimsa in India but he spent a lifetime elaborating a rational structure for his faith, in which he reasoned: self-sacrifice is superior to the sacrifice of others; if the cause is not right then only the resisters will
suffer; nonviolence is the aseptic way of permitting the poison to work itself out by letting all the natural forces have full play; nonviolence arouses the best in others; apparent good from violence is temporary, while the evil is permanent; good brought through force destroys individuality, while nonviolent non-cooperation preserves individuality.

Christian pacifists call upon the New Testament for support but they have reasons of their own. Quakers, for example, invoke the example of Christ but they also justify nonviolence as answering “that of God” in other men; in fighting, they explain, one side or the other loses while in the nonviolent way there is the possibility that both sides may win; they point out that force can produce a superficial unity such as exists in a machine but not organic unity born of an appeal to the “Light” within.

Tolstoy reasoned that life lost through nonviolent resistance can be only a fraction of that lost in violent revolutions.

Manifestly the nonviolent spirit may be born in and, in some respects, nurtured by the workings of all these forces: one's heritage, one's extremity, one's reason. But nonviolence lives and grows also by experimentation. Gandhi's life was an experiment with truth and the means to truth, nonviolence. His life, he said, consisted of nothing more than these experiments. In a sense he was a scientist, claiming no finality concerning his conclusions, accepting here and rejecting there; seeking always, as he said, to satisfy his reason and his heart.

Second, nonviolence is not a single virtue or a single quality of life; it is a congeries of virtues, of qualities; it is a spirit, a way of life, a religion, or as Gandhi would say, the law of one's being. In Gandhi's structure, there are two basic pillars, truth and ahimsa or nonviolence or, as he also called it, love. Truth is the end; nonviolence is the means. But the end and the means are bound irrevocably to each other, for a vision of truth is dependent upon the realization of nonviolence. As truth is God, so also love is God. Love surely is not a single virtue; it is a way of life, it is a religion. His life he considered as one indivisible whole. “What”, he asks, “was the larger ‘symbiosis’ that Buddha and Christ preached? Gentleness and love.”48

Let us look, then, at those qualities of life which comprise the symbiosis which Gandhi called nonviolence. True nonviolence is religion, for it is a total commitment to that which the individual regards as supreme in the world. In Gandhi, however, and in every authentic example of nonviolence there is a suspicion of and often a revolt against other-worldliness, excessive ritualism, insistence upon theology, and ecclesiasticism. Gandhi, however, was wise. Although he considered himself a true reformer he never permitted his zeal to lead him to the rejection of anything in Hinduism which he considered essential. Nowhere, indeed, was his genius more apparent than in the synthesis he achieved between the history, the language, and certain forms of his religious heritage on the one hand and a radical reinterpretation of religion on the other.

For Gandhi the essence of religion is morality. “I reject any religious doctrine that does not appeal to reason and is in conflict with morality.”49 Unreasonable religious
sentiment he could tolerate but not when it was immoral. In his philosophy “there is no such thing as religion overriding morality”.50

For Gandhi the golden rule of conduct, the conduct called nonviolence, was mutual toleration, for he realized that all men will never think as one and that truth will always appear in fragments.

For him all religions are true, all religions contain some error, all religions were almost as dear to him as his own Hinduism. His prayer for another was “…not ‘God, give him the light that Thou hast given me’, but ‘Give him all the light and truth he needs for his highest development’ ”.51

This did not mean an abandonment of what he believed and held dear. He said he would let the winds of doctrine blow through the windows and doors of his house but he would refuse to be swept off his feet. His own religion he would not abandon but he would do what he could to improve and purify it.

For Gandhi nonviolence is inconceivable without self-renunciation. “I must reduce myself to zero”, he said, for “ahimsa is the farthest limit of humanity”52 In things material he did reduce himself to all but zero. Wherever I walked or talked with him, morning, afternoon, or evening, in a remote village or a great city, it was always the same—nothing of dress, of furniture, of house, of livery of any sort to distract. There was no hurry. When he walked into a woman’s home and saw the miserable inadequacy of what she wore, he immediately reduced his own dress next to zero and continued to do this until he died.

Gandhi knew too well that men who are burdened with possessions they love are never really free. He warned, however, that renunciation of desire is far more important than the renunciation of objects. In abstention as in all other matters he emphasized that the spirit was the matter. “A man”, he says, “over-scrupulous in diet is an utter stranger to ahimsa and a pitiful wretch if he is a slave to selfishness and passions and is hard of heart”.

Nonviolence is compassion. At midnight on 15 August 1947 I listened to Mr. Nehru as he spoke on the transfer of power that was then taking place from the British Government to India. He referred to Gandhi, who was absent, as one who if he could would wipe every tear from every eye. Nowhere in our time, perhaps even for a thousand years, have men known one with greater compassion for his fellowmen. When he could not give them the clothes they needed he reduced his own to the barest minimum. When the removal of untouchable slums was beyond his power, he made his home in one. He dedicated his life to the breaking of the chains that bound his people. He died a martyr because he dared to fight the cause of a people called enemies by some of his own community. The innocent child and the convict, the harmless beggar at his door and his alien oppressor, all alike were the objects of his compassion.

This was compassion, moreover, that found expression in a great constructive program designed to free the body and lift the spirit—a program of spinning and other crafts, of village organization, of education. For him the spinning wheel became the
symbol par excellence of nonviolence. It united the people peacefully and in common trust. It promised relief from degrading poverty.

Finally, nonviolence is a weapon of the strong. My final conversation with Gandhi was in Calcutta in August of 1947 when riots raged between Hindus and Muslims, the Hindus, now in authority, being the aggressors. I raised a question of the efficacy of the nonviolent technique in group relations. He declared that on that subject he was at the moment in darkness. He had spent almost a lifetime teaching that nonviolence was a weapon not of the weak but of the strong, of those who are able to strike back but will not. He realized then that his people did not understand. This is one of the most difficult aspects of nonviolence to fathom and accept and the explanation for the failure of so many efforts in its name. Nonviolence is not an expedient to be used when no other instrument is available and one is otherwise powerless. It is not a tactic, a strategy. It is a way of life, a religion. It begins in personal relations, in attitudes towards all men—the strong and the weak; it expresses itself in thought, in speech, as well as in action.

This does not mean that mass nonviolence should never be attempted until every participant has attained perfection. It does require that the ideal be clear, that there be commitment, that men shall be in candidacy for the quality of spirit and life exemplified in Jesus of Nazareth and which so lately wasrevealed among us in Mohandas K. Gandhi.

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02. A STUDY OF THE MEANINGS OF NONVIOLENCE

By Gene Sharp

“Non-violence”, “nonviolent resistance”, “satyagraha” and “pacifism” are words now frequently found in such newspapers as the *Manchester Guardian*, *The Times*, and the *New York Times*.

The Negroes of Montgomery, Alabama, conduct a year-long nonviolent bus boycott. Danilo Dolci is jailed for leading hungry Sicilians in a nonviolent demonstration. Jehovah’s Witnesses continue to gain adherents to their creed, which includes refusal of military duty. The word “pacifism” appears frequently in news reports from Germany.

The crews of the ketch Golden Rule go to prison for attempting to stop U.S. nuclear tests by sailing into the Pacific “proving grounds”. The Welsh Nationalists use nonviolent resistance in addition to educational and electoral methods in their struggle for Welsh self-government. Young Frenchmen begin their fifth year in prison as war resisters.

London newspapers headline the arrest of 45 opponents of nuclear weapons for civil disobedience in non-violently “invading” a rocket base site in an effort to halt construction. In India, Vinoba Bhave redistributes land by “looting with love”. A Mennonite father refuses to send his children to an Ohio school because they will be taught war-like and un-Godly ideas. Commander Sir Stephen King-Hall lectures to top British naval, army and air-force officers on “The Alternative to the Nuclear Deterrent: Nonviolent Resistance”. Women of Budapest Stop Russian tanks by lying down in front of them.

Film star Don Murray, as a religious pacifist, helps resettle World War II refugees still without homes. South African “Black Sash” women keep silent vigils to defend the Constitution. Hundreds in Britain march four days in rain, snow and sun to the Aldermaston Atomic Weapons Research Establishment in protest against nuclear weapons. The All-African Peoples’ Conference in Accra pledges support for nonviolent resistance, including civil disobedience, movements for the liberation of Africa.

Although almost everyone says the world must end war forever or be destroyed, the ideas and ideals of “nonviolence” and methods of nonviolent social action are still espoused by only minorities. But they have now risen to sufficient prominence that they must be reckoned with in world thinking and events. Gandhi is in large degree responsible for this. The impact of “nonviolence”, however, is now felt in many parts of the world and arises from diverse sources. This increased awareness of “nonviolence” has come despite (or because of) the fact that many of the ideas, ideals and methods of “nonviolence” run counter to established orthodoxies and
socially approved behaviour. They also stand in contrast to modern developments of violence: totalitarianism and nuclear weapons.

Despite this growing awareness of “nonviolence” there is widespread confusion about just what “nonviolence” is. All the above examples and many more have been labeled with the terms “nonviolence” and “pacifism”. This lack of clarity has its effect on the groups promoting nonviolent approaches, on criticisms by their opponents, and on the thinking of still others. The usual degree of misunderstanding which may result from a varied and imprecise use of terms becomes plain confusion when the phenomena concerned are relatively little known. When these phenomena include unorthodox ideas, beliefs and methods of resistance—each of which may be associated with strong emotions among both proponents and opponents—the confusion may become chaos.

At first glance, all that is “not violence” may seem to be of a single kind. In a society where such systems of ideas, beliefs and behaviour are usually regarded as esoteric, “crack-pot”, impractical, dangerous or simply strange, few people undertake a sufficiently serious examination of these phenomena to make them aware that quite different types of belief and behaviour are involved. “Pacifism”, “passive resistance” “nonviolence” and the other terms are commonly used either as broad generalities (glittering, scathing or just vague) or with a wide variety of more specific meanings for the same word. A failure, however, to discern the very real differences among the various types of “nonviolence” and to exercise more care in the use of the terms may have a number of undesirable consequences. Two of these are that evaluation of the merits and demerits of those approaches will be seriously handicapped, and that research in this area will face unnecessary difficulties.

Persons rejecting violence on grounds of principle have rarely analyzed the relation of their particular belief systems to others also rejecting violence. They have failed to do this largely because such analysis has seemed to them irrelevant: their duty was to follow the imperatives of their beliefs. However, some of them have recognized differences in motivation and behaviour among those rejecting violence. For example, Guy F. Hershberger, a Mennonite, distinguishes between “nonresistance” and “modern pacifism”. Non-resistance, he says, describes the faith and life of those “who cannot have any part in warfare because they believe the Bible forbids it, and who renounce all coercion, even nonviolent coercion”. Pacifism, he says, is “a term which covers many types of opposition to war”.

Some Western pacifists have seen Gandhi’s approach as sufficiently different from their own that they felt it was not genuinely “pacifist”. Reginald Reynolds writes: “A reading of ‘official’ [British] pacifist literature from, say, 1920 onwards would reveal some odd things which many pacifists would prefer to forget. People accepted as ‘leading pacifists’ were, as late as 1930, writing abusive articles about
Gandhi and defending British Rule in India. Such articles and letters could be found in *The Friend* (weekly unofficial paper of the Quakers), in *Reconciliation* (monthly organ of the Fellowship of Reconciliation), and in *No More War* (the monthly organ of the [No More War] movement).”

Western pacifists have sometimes distinguished between the “religious” pacifists and the “nonreligious” pacifists who base their pacifism on “humanitarian” or “philosophical” considerations. This distinction has also been made by non-pacifists. Pacifists have also recognized differences among themselves in their response to military conscription. There have been: (a) the “absolutists” who believe in civil disobedience to such laws and refuse cooperation with the administrative agencies for military conscription even to obtain their personal exemption from military duty where the law allows for such exemption; (b) those who refuse entry into the armed forces (even as non-combatants) but are willing to cooperate with the conscription system to obtain their exemption from military duty and are willing to perform alternative civilian work where such alternative is allowed; and (c) those who refuse to bear arms but are willing to perform noncombatant (e.g. medical) duties within the armed forces.

Although Gandhi never wrote systematic treatises on “nonviolence”, he did distinguish between two or more types of “nonviolence.” After first calling his South African protest movements “passive resistance”, he discarded the term and adopted a new term, satyagraha. “When in a meeting of Europeans I found that the term ‘passive resistance’ was too narrowly construed that it was supposed to be a weapon of the weak, that it could be characterized by hatred, and that it could finally manifest itself as violence, I had to demur to all these statements and explain the real nature of the Indian movement. It was clear that a new word must be coined by the Indians to designate their struggle.”

Gandhi also seems to have assumed an implicit distinction between Western pacifism and Satyagraha, although explicit statements to this effect are difficult to find. Bharatan Kumarappa, in an introductory note to a small collection of Gandhi’s writings prepared for the World Pacifist Conference in India, December 1949—January 1950, writes: “It is a far cry….from pacifism to Gandhiji’s idea of nonviolence. While pacifism hopes to get rid of war chiefly by refusing to fight and by carrying on propaganda against war, Gandhiji goes much deeper and sees that war cannot be avoided, so long as the seeds of it remain in man’s breast and grow and develop in his social, political and economic life. Gandhiji’s cure is, therefore, very radical and far-reaching. It demands nothing less than rooting out violence from oneself and from one’s environment.”

The American sociologist Clarence Marsh Case in his study of such phenomena explicitly recognizes differences between various types, although he makes no
attempt to develop a typology. He uses the terms “nonviolent resistance” and “passive resistance” interchangeably.\textsuperscript{12}

Political scientist Dr Mulford Sibley has distinguished three types of “nonviolence”: Hindu pacifism (satyagraha), Christian pacifism, and revolutionary secular pacifism.\textsuperscript{13} This classification, however, did not purport to encompass the field of “nonviolence” and was limited to those modern types of pacifism containing political theory. Professor Leo Kuper of the Sociology Department of Natal University has distinguished between nonviolent resistance movements aimed at achieving their goals by means of embarrassment and conversion of their opponents respectively;\textsuperscript{14} but, again, this does not purport to be a full typology.

Theodore Paullin\textsuperscript{15} comes close to developing a typology of “nonviolence”, although this was not his main intention. Paullin structured his discussion on the basis of six types resulting from a continuum “at one end of which we place violence coupled with hatred, and at the other, dependence only upon the application of positive love and goodwill. In the intermediate positions we might place (1) violence without hatred, (2) nonviolence practiced by necessity rather than because of principle, (3) nonviolent coercion, (4) satyagraha and nonviolent direct action, and (5) nonresistance.”\textsuperscript{16} The nonviolence extremity of his continuum, “active goodwill and reconciliation”, becomes the sixth type. Because Paullin’s main objective in the booklet was to consider the application of “nonviolent means of achieving group purposes”\textsuperscript{17} his classification has suffered through lack of development and refinement. Some types of “nonviolence” have not been included,\textsuperscript{18} and some seem classified incorrectly.\textsuperscript{19} Paullin has, however, made a genuine contribution towards developing a typology.

\textbf{GENERIC NONVIOLENCE}

The whole gamut of behaviour and belief characterized by an abstention from physical violence is hereafter described by the term “generic nonviolence”. This is the sense in which the term “nonviolence” has been hitherto used in this paper.\textsuperscript{20} “Generic nonviolence” thus includes a wide variety of types of “nonviolence”: all the examples briefly listed in the opening section of this paper and more. These vary widely on several points, such as whether “nonviolence” is viewed as intrinsically good or simply as an effective method of action, the degree of passivity and activity, the presence or absence of strategy, and whether the followers of the approach are “other worldly” or “this worldly”. These phenomena have in common only the abstention from physical violence, either generally or in meeting particular conflict situations, or both. Not included in this broad classification are: (1) hermits and (2) cases of cowardice (both involving a de facto withdrawal, though for different reasons, from aspects of life involving physical violence rather than the
offering of a nonviolent response in the situation); and (3) legislation, State decrees, etc. (backed by threat of physical violence, as imprisonment, execution, etc).

__PACIFISM__

The term ‘pacifism’ as here defined, includes the belief systems of those persons and groups who, as a minimum, refuse participation in all international or civil wars or violent revolutions and base this refusal on moral, ethical or religious principle. Such persons and groups are here called “pacifists”. “Pacifism” is thus a narrower term than “generic nonviolence”, and is an intermediary classification including several of the types of generic nonviolence described below. These are indicated below after the typology.

__NONVIOLENT RESISTANCE AND DIRECT ACTION__

“Nonviolent resistance and direct action” is another intermediary classification, being both narrower than “generic nonviolence” and broader than the specific types. The methods of “nonviolent resistance and direct action” fall on a continuum between personal exemplary behaviour and verbal persuasion at one end and sabotage and physical violence at the other.

“Nonviolent resistance and direct action” refers to those methods of resistance and direct action without physical violence in which the members of the nonviolent group perform either (1) acts of omission—that is, they refuse to perform acts which they usually perform, and are expected by custom to perform or are required by law or regulation to perform; or (2) acts of commission—that is, they insist on performing acts which they usually do not perform, are not expected by custom to perform or are forbidden by law or regulation from performing; or (3) both.

These methods are “extra-constitutional”: that is, they do not rely upon established procedures of the State (whether parliamentary or non-parliamentary) for achieving their objective. Such acts may be directed towards a change in, or abolition of, existing attitudes, values, social patterns, customs or social structure, or a combination of these. Such change or abolition may take place whether these attitudes etc. are of the society as a whole or of only a section of it. Such acts may also be directed, in defense of attitudes, values, social patterns, customs, or social structure, or a combination of these, against attempts of the opponent to alter or to abolish them, whether by the introduction of particular or general innovations or both.

In some cases of nonviolent resistance and direct action the primary intent is to change attitudes and values as a preliminary to changing policies. In other cases, the primary intent is to change policies (or thwart attempts to change policies) whether
or not the opponents have first changed their attitudes and values. In other cases, the intent may be to change simultaneously attitudes and policies. Included in “nonviolent resistance and direct action” are those cases where violence has been rejected because of (1) religious, ethical or moral reasons; (2) considerations of expediency; and (3) mixed motivations of various types. Where the behaviour of the nonviolent group is primarily *resistance*, usually acts of omission, it can be described simply as “non-violent resistance”. Where the behaviour of the nonviolent group is primarily *intervention*, usually acts of commission, it can be described as “nonviolent direct action”\(^{21}\). The types of generic nonviolence which are included in the category “nonviolent resistance and direct action”\(^{22}\) are indicated below following the typology.

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**THE TYPES OF GENERIC NONVIOLENCE**

In developing this typology, the writer has sought to observe the “natural” groupings or types as they seem to exist, rather than preselecting certain criteria and then seeking to fit the phenomena into the pre-determined categories. After a classification of the types had been made, the writer sought to examine what were the intrinsic characteristics possessed by the respective types which distinguish them from the others. The criteria which emerged include such factors as whether the motivation for nonviolence is expediency, principle, or mixed; whether the nonviolent group’s belief system is “other worldly” or “this worldly”: whether or not the nonviolent group has a program of social change; what is the nonviolent group’s attitude towards the opponents; whether all or only some physical violence is rejected; whether the nonviolent group is concerned with its own integrity; and others. Following the description of the types of generic nonviolence, appears a chart listing the main criteria which emerged.

The nine types of generic nonviolence described below are: non-resistance, active reconciliation, moral resistance, selective nonviolence, passive resistance, peaceful resistance, nonviolent direct action, satyagraha, and nonviolent revolution.\(^{23}\)\(^{24}\) These are listed roughly in the order of increasing activity.\(^{25}\) *There are no strict separations between some of these types, and particular cases may not seem to fit exactly into any one of them.* This classification should be viewed simply as a tool to facilitate understanding and study of the phenomena, a tool which is neither perfect nor final, but may nevertheless be useful.

The examples cited and statements used as illustrations for the respective types have been chosen from those available to the writer on the basis of their adequacy as illustrations and because of the presence of suitable documentation. There is no pretence that the examples cited are geographically representative or exhaustive of
the cases belonging to each type. Further research on each of these types could provide abundant additional examples and illustrative statements.

NON-RESISTANCE

The non-resistant reject on principle all physical violence, whether on an individual, State or international level. There are various Christian sects of this type, such as the Mennonites and the Amish. They refuse participation in war; and also in the State by holding government office, voting or having recourse to the courts. They pay their taxes, however, and do what the State demands, as long as it is not inconsistent with what they consider to be their duty to God. They refuse to resist evil situations even by nonviolent techniques, and in times of oppression simply hold to their beliefs and follow them—ignoring the evil as much as possible, and suffering their lot as part of their religious duty.

The non-resistant are concerned with being true to their beliefs and maintaining their own integrity, rather than with attempts at social reconstruction, many even opposing attempts to create a good society here on earth. A common belief of the non-resistant is that it is not possible for the world as a whole to become free from sin, and therefore, the Christian should withdraw from evil. Such influence as they have on society results from their acts of goodwill (such as relief work), their exhortations and their example.

The non-resistant have their roots in early Christianity. With very few exceptions, the early Christians refused all military service and subservience to the Roman emperor. The crucial change began under the reign of Constantine, who was converted to Christianity in 312 A.D. and declared it to be the State religion in 321 A.D. After the main Christian groups began to turn towards the State for support and no longer refused participation in war, small heretical groups perpetuated the pacifist interpretation of Christianity. They were cruelly persecuted. Some of their names have been lost.

In the Middle Ages and later there were many sects which sought a return to what they believed to be the basic gospel. Among these were the Albigenses or Cathari; “Christ's Poor”; the Waldenses, or “The Poor Men of Lyons”; the “Humilates”; the Bohemian Brethren, of the Church of the Unitas Fratrum: the revived Unitas Fratrum or the Moravian Church; the Schwenkfelders; the German Baptists or Dunkers; the Obbenites; the Mennonites; the Collegiants (which represented a movement for a creedless spiritual worship within the existing denominations); the Simonians; the Socinians; and the Brownists. Some of these were Anabaptist sects.

Hershberger describes these sects thus: “Alongside the mediaeval church there were certain small, intimate groups of Christians who refused to accept a compromise with
the social order. They stood aloof and maintained that indifference or hostility to the world which characterized the primitive church. These groups are known as the sects. They generally refused to use the law, to take the oath, to exercise domination over others, or to participate in war. Theirs was not an ascetic emphasis on heroic and vicarious achievement. It was not an opposition, in most cases, to the sense life or the average life of humanity, but simply an opposition to the social institutions of the world.

“The sects generally emphasized lay religion, personal ethical achievement, religious equality, brotherly love, indifference to the state and the ruling classes, dislike of the law and oath, and the ideal of poverty and frugality, direct personal religious relationship, appeal to the primitive church, criticism of the theologians. They always demanded a high standard of moral performance. This made for small groups, of course, but what they lost in the spirit of universalism, they made up for in intensity of life. This tradition of the sects was carried down from the Montanists and Dontanists through the Waldensians to the followers of Wycliff and Huss to the Anabaptists.”

Describing one of the non-resistant sects, the Mennonites, C. Henry Smith writes: “They adopted bodily the faith of the peaceful type of Anabaptists, and that was a rejection of all civil and a great deal of the prevailing ecclesiastical government as unnecessary for the Christian”. They “went no further, however, in their opposition to the temporal authority than to declare that the true church and the temporal powers had nothing in common and must be entirely separate; not only must the state not interfere with the church, but the true Christian must be entirely free from participating in civil matters. The temporal authority must needs exist, since it was instituted of God to punish the wicked, but in that work the Christian had no hand. This position they reached from a literal interpretation of the Sermon on the Mount, where Christ taught his disciples, among other things, to ‘love their enemies’ and to ‘swear not at all’. Hence their position involved opposition to the oath, holding of office, and bearing of arms.”

In 1917 in America the general conference and various branches of the Mennonite Church united in addressing a signed “Appeal to the President” in which they said: “Because of our understanding of the teachings of Christ and New Testament generally against war in any form, we can render no service, either combatant or non-combatant, under the military establishment, but will rather be amenable to any punishment the government sees fit to lay upon us as a penalty”.

ACTIVE RECONCILIATION
The nonviolence of this group, favouring the use of active goodwill and reconciliation, is based upon principle. It refers not only to outward actions, but to
personal reconciliation and improvement of one’s own life before attempting to change others. “Its proponents seek to accomplish a positive alteration in the attitude and policy of the group or person responsible for some undesirable situation; but they never use coercion—even nonviolent coercion. Rather they seek to convince their opponent.....They place their emphasis on the positive action of goodwill which they will use rather than upon a catalogue of violent actions which they will not use.”

A large part of the basis of this approach is the importance placed on the worth of very individual and the belief that he can change. Direct action and strategy are not involved. Tolstoy and many of his followers, and much of the present Society of Friends (Quakers), are proponents of this type of generic nonviolence. So also are many other individual pacifists.

Tolstoy rejected the use of violence under all circumstances and also private property and association with institutions which practise coercion over men. Tolstoy depended upon the power of example and goodwill to influence men. He sought a regeneration of society as a whole through the practice of love in all one's relationships, simple living, self-service, and the persuasion of others to follow this way of life.

In Tolstoy's own words: “.....it is this acknowledgement of the law of love as the supreme law of human life, and this clearly expressed guidance for conduct resulting from the Christian teaching of love, embracing enemies and those who hate, offend and curse us, that constitute the peculiarity of Christ's teaching, and by giving to the doctrine of love, and to the guidance flowing therefrom, an exact and definite meaning, inevitably involve a complete change of the established organization of life, not only in Christendom, but among all the nations of the earth.”

“The time will come—it is already coming—when the Christian principles of equality and fraternity, community of property, non-resistance of evil by force, will appear just as natural and simple as the principles of family or social life seem to us now.”

“The Christian will not dispute with any one, nor attack any one, nor use violence against any one. On the contrary, he will bear violence without opposing it. But by this very attitude to violence, he will not only himself be free, but will free the whole world from all external power.”

George Fox and the early Quakers recognized religious experience as the final authority in religion, in place of the Scriptures which were the authority of the non-resistant sects and other Protestants. The Friends believe that the life of every person, however degraded, has worth and is guided by an Inner Light (sometimes called “the spirit of Christ”). This rule out any right to constrain men by means of violence. Also involved in it is the conviction that men should live the kind of life which removes the occasion for wars and builds a world of peace. Friends in general have not completely rejected the use of force by a civil government and often today work for the adoption of legislation and sometimes hold office, even as judges.
Early Quakers, believing in the imminence of the spiritual regeneration of the world, eventually identified themselves with the civil government, expecting to administer to affairs of state on the principles of love, kindness and goodwill. With most Quakers there was a fundamental difference between the use of force in personal relations and by the military on one hand, and by a civil government on the other. After some years of Quaker administration in Pennsylvania, the Quakers withdrew from the government. There is variation in opinion on the matter among present day Quakers, many of whom are not pacifists. Quakers have made large efforts at international relief and reconstruction, international conciliation and peace education, social reform activities and conscientious objection.

Quakers describe their belief in peace in such terms as these: “The conviction that the spirit of Christ dwells in the souls of all men is the source of our refusal to take part in war, and of our opposition to slavery and oppression in every form. We believe that the primary Christian duty in relation to others is to appeal to that of God in them and, therefore, any method of oppression or violence that renders such an appeal impossible must be set out on one side.”

“There is a right and possible way for the family of nations to live together at peace. . . . It is the way of active, reconciling love, of overcoming evil with good. We feel an inward compulsion, which we cannot disregard, to strive to follow the way of constructive goodwill, despite the sense of our own shortcomings and despite the failure, in which we have shared, to labour sufficiently for the Kingdom of God on earth.”

“The fundamental ground of our opposition to war is religious and ethical. It attaches to the nature of God as revealed in Christ and to the nature of man as related to Him….The only absolute ground for an unalterable and inevitable opposition to war is one which attaches to the inherent nature of right and wrong, one which springs out of the consciousness of obligation to what the enlightened soul knows ought to be.” This peace testimony “never was ‘adopted’”. For “it is not a policy; it is a conviction of the soul. It cannot be followed at one time and surrendered at another time…. The Christian way of life revealed in the New Testament, the voice of conscience revealed in the soul, the preciousness of personality revealed in the transforming force of love, and the irrationality revealed in modern warfare, either together or singly, present grounds which for those who feel them make participation in war under any conditions impossible.” Friends “do not rest their case on sporadic texts. They find themselves confronted with a Christianity, the Christianity of the Gospels, that calls for a radical transformation of man, for the creation of a new type of person and for the building of a new social order, and they take this with utmost seriousness as a thing to be ventured and tried.”
Persons sharing the “active reconciliation” beliefs often prefer a rather quietist approach to social problems, disliking anything akin to “agitation” or “trouble”. Some of them may thus oppose nonviolent resistance and direct action (including strikes, boycotts, etc.) and even outspoken verbal statements, believing such methods to be violent in spirit, perhaps even immoral, and harmful in their effects on the opponent. They would prefer much more quiet methods, such as personal representations, letters and private deputations.

MORAL RESISTANCE

Believers in “moral resistance”—a matter of principle—are convinced that evil should be resisted, but only by peaceful and moral means. The emphasis on individual moral responsibility is an important part of this approach. “Moral resistance” includes both a personal refusal of individuals to participate in evil—such as war or, earlier, slavery—and an imperative for individuals to do something actively against the evil, such as speaking, writing or preaching. Nonviolent resistance and direct action are not ruled out, though the major emphasis is usually placed upon education, persuasion and individual example. Believers in “moral resistance” in Western society, although lacking an over-all social analysis or comprehensive program of social change, generally favour gradual social reform through such methods as legislation, education and efforts to influence government officials.

The pacifism of various peace societies in New England during the middle of the last century was of this type. Adin Ballou and William Lloyd Garrison (of anti-slavery fame) were well-known spokesmen for these groups. A part of the “Declaration of Sentiments” (written by Garrison) adopted by the Peace Convention, Boston, 18-20 September 1838 reads: “We register our testimony, not only against all wars, whether offensive or defensive but all preparations for war....Hence we deem it unlawful to bear arms or to hold a military office....As a measure of sound policy.... as well as on the ground of allegiance to Him who is King of Kings and Lord of Lords, we cordially adopt the Non Resistance principle, being confident that it provides for all possible consequences, will ensure all things needful to us, is armed with omnipotent power, and must ultimately triumph over assailing force....

“But while we shall adhere to the doctrine of Non-Resistance and passive submission to enemies, we purpose, in a moral and spiritual sense, to speak and act boldly; to assail iniquity, in high places and in low places; to apply our principles to all existing civil, political, legal and ecclesiastical institutions.... We shall employ lecturers, circulate tracts and publications, form societies, and petition our state and national governments, in relation to the subject of universal peace. It will be our leading object to devise ways and means for effecting a radical change in the views, feelings
and practices of society, respecting the sinfulness of war and the treatment of enemies.”

“The term non-resistance....requires very considerable qualifications. I use it as applicable only to the conduct of human beings towards human beings—not towards the inferior animals, inanimate thing or satanic influences....But I go further, and disclaim using the term to express absolute passivity even towards human beings. I claim the right to offer the utmost moral resistance, not sinful, of which God has made me capable, to every manifestation of evil among mankind. Nay, I hold it my duty to offer such moral resistance. In this sense my very non resistance becomes the highest kind of resistance to evil....There is an uninjurious, benevolent physical force. There are cases in which it would not only be allowable, but in the highest degree commendable, to restrain human beings by this kind of force...as maniacs, the delirious, the intoxicated, etc. And in cases where deadly violence is inflicted with deliberation and malice of forethought, one may nobly throw his body as a temporary barrier between the destroyer and his helpless victim, choosing to die in that position, rather than be a passive spectator. Thus another most important qualification is given to the term non-resistance.....It is simply non-resistance of injury with injury—evil with evil.”

Garrison states his interpretation of “non-resistance” in these terms: “Non-Resistance is...a state of activity, ever fighting the good fight of faith, ever foremost to assail unjust power, ever struggling for liberty, equality, fraternity, in no national sense, but in a world-wide spirit. It is passive only in this sense—that it will not return evil for evil, nor give blow for blow, nor resort to murderous weapons for protection or defense.”

He illustrates the “moral resistance” attitude towards methods to be used in a social struggle in his speech at the New England Abolitionists Convention, Boston, 26 May 1858: “When the antislavery cause was launched it was baptized in the spirit of peace.... I do not believe that the weapons of liberty ever have been, or ever can be, the weapons of despotism. I know that those of despotism are the sword, the revolver, the cannon, the bomb shell; and therefore, the weapons to which tyrants cling, and upon which they depend, are not the weapons for me, as a friend of liberty. I will not trust the war spirit anywhere in the universe of God, because the experience of six thousand years proves it not to be at all reliable in such a struggle as ours....I pray you, Abolitionists, still adhere to that truth....Blood.....shall not flow through any counsel of mine. Much as I detest the oppression exercised by the Southern slave holder, he is a man, sacred before me....I have no other weapon to wield against him but the simple truth of God, which is the great instrument for the overthrow of all iniquity and the salvation of the world.”
A very large part of contemporary Western pacifists is of this type, although there is variation within the membership of most of the pacifist organizations. The U.S. Fellowship of Reconciliation (a religious, largely Christian, pacifist organization), for example, contains members sharing the non-resistance and active reconciliation positions, although it is probable that a very large percentage belong in the moral resistance category. The organization’s Statement of Purpose largely reflects this position:

“Although members do not bind themselves to any exact form of words, they refuse to participate in any war or to sanction military preparations; they work to abolish war and to foster goodwill among nations, races and classes; they strive to build a social order which will suffer no individual or groups to be exploited for the profit or pleasure of another, and which will ensure to all the means for realizing the best possibilities of life; they advocate such ways of dealing with offenders against society as shall transform the wrongdoer rather than inflict retributive punishment; they endeavour to show reverence for personality—in the home, in the education of children, in association with those of other classes, nationalities and races; they seek to avoid bitterness and contention, and to maintain the spirit of self-giving love while engaged in the struggle to achieve these purposes.”

A non-Western example of “moral resistance” is the pacifism of the traditional Hopi Indian Nation. They are now seeking to spread their views which they believe may be helpful to other people. Dan Kachongva, leading adviser and spokesman of the traditional Hopis, says that people are turning away from the Life Plan of the Great Spirit. “Each and every human being knows these simple instructions upon which are based all the various Life Plans and religions of the Great Spirit”, he said. The laws of the Great Spirit must be followed even though they might conflict with other “laws”. All the various instructions of the Great Spirit came from “the seed of one basic instruction: ‘You must not kill; you must love your neighbour as yourself’. From this one commandment to respect and reverence life, came all the other commandments: to tell the truth, to share what we have; to live together so we can help each other out; to take care of our children and old people, the sick and strangers, friends and enemies; to not get drunk, or commit adultery, or lie or cheat, or steal, or get rich, because all these negative acts cause fights and struggles which divide the community into groups too small to support and carry on the life stream.”

SELECTIVE NONVIOLENCE

The chief characteristic of “selective nonviolence” is the refusal to participate in particular violent conflicts, usually international wars. In certain other situations the same persons might be willing to use violence to accomplish the desired ends. The two most obvious examples are the international Socialists, especially during
World War I, and Jehovah’s Witnesses. Also included are non-pacifist anarchists, objectors primarily concerned with authoritarianism, and other non-pacifists who believe that the manufacture and use of nuclear weapons can never be justified.

The international Socialists object to war because, they declare, it is a product of capitalism, and there is no reason why the workers of one country should fight the workers of another when the real enemy of the workers of all countries is capitalism. Most, but not all, of the Socialist objectors to World War I would have participated in a violent revolution of the working people to abolish capitalism, imperialism and greed, and to bring in the cooperative commonwealth. Their objections were intimately tied up with their conception of the class struggle. This conception is reflected in the 1917 St Louis Manifesto, overwhelmingly approved by the Socialist Party, U.S.A.

“The Socialist Party of the United States in the present grave crisis reaffirms its allegiance to the principle of internationalism and working-class solidarity the world over, and proclaims its unalterable opposition to the war just declared by the government of the United States....The mad orgy of death which is now convulsing unfortunate Europe was caused by the conflict of capitalist interests in European countries. In each of these countries the workers were oppressed and exploited....The ghastly war in Europe......was the logical outcome of the competitive capitalist system.....Our entrance into the European war was instigated by the predatory capitalists of the United States who boast of the enormous profits of seven billion dollars from the manufacture and sale of munitions and war supplies and from the exportation of American foodstuffs and other necessities....We brand the declaration of war by our government as a crime against the people of the United States and against the nations of the world.”

The same majority report also stated: “...the only struggle which would justify the workers in taking up arms is the great struggle of the working class of the world to free itself from economic exploitation and political oppression...”

At a party State Convention in Canton, Ohio, Eugene Debs declared: “The master class has always declared the wars; the subject class has always fought the battles. The master class has had all to gain and nothing to lose, while the subject class has had nothing to gain and all to lose—especially their lives.” On trial in 1918 for violation of the U.S. Sedition Act on ten counts allegedly committed during that speech, Debs told the jury: “It (the St Louis Manifesto) said, in effect, to the people, especially the workers, of all countries, ‘Quit going to war. Stop murdering one another for the profit and glory of the ruling classes. Cultivate the arts of peace. Humanize humanity. Civilize civilization’.”

In Britain, the Independent Labour Party; in the United States, the Socialist Party, U.S.A., and the Socialist Labour Party; in Russia, the Bolsheviks; and in Germany, the
group of Socialists led by Karl Liebnecht and Rosa Luxemburg opposed World War I. Most other Socialist groups abandoned the Socialist doctrine on war at that time. Only a few Socialists opposed World War II on similar grounds. The Socialist Party, U.S.A. (only a remnant of the earlier party), for example, tried to maintain a position of “neutrality” on the war, neither supporting nor opposing it, while some of its members gave full support, some gave critical support, and some opposed it. In most countries, Socialist groups fully supported the war. Jehovah’s Witnesses also object to particular violent conflicts. They regard all governments that took part in World War II as being equally guilty. The existing governments of all nations are regarded as being ruled by Satan; the Witnesses declare that the existing governments have failed because they merely rendered lip service to morality. To support any such government is to support Satan and to deny God. The present wars are regarded as merely a sign of the end of an age and a preliminary worldly step before the righteous King Jesus soon returns to establish his heavenly rule on earth. The people of goodwill will survive the Battle of Armageddon, which will be fought by angels against Satan’s organization, “carry out the divine mandate to ‘fill the earth’ with a righteous race.” The Witnesses are not prohibited from using violence in their personal relationships or in resisting persecution, as they once were. If God were concerned with the present wars, as he was with some earlier ones, they would be willing to fight. The Witnesses were sent to conscientious objector camps, interned, imprisoned, or sent to concentration camps by both sides during World War II.

Stroup, in his study of the movement, writes: “The law of God forbids the Witnesses to engage in war. The view has commonly been taken that they are pacifists. Such they are not, for they feel that they must often employ physical force to resist persecution, and they also believe that Jehovah has engaged in and encouraged wars between peoples. The Witnesses will not engage in the present war [World War II] because they think that Jehovah is not concerned with it; otherwise they would be quite willing to fight. Most of them believe that Satan is ‘running the whole show’ and therefore they will have nothing to do with it. This is similar to their attitude towards the first World War. The Witnesses were interned by both sides, because the Society boldly stated that the war was being fought by equally selfish interests and without the sanction of God. Their own fight, they declared, was not fought with ‘carnal weapons’: it was a battle of cosmic proportions with the adversary of every man, Satan.”

The position of certain non-pacifist but anti-war anarchists would come under this classification also. Their position is similar to that of the international Socialists, in that they under certain circumstances would be willing to use violence to abolish the existing order of society to bring in the classless, stateless, and warless society of their dreams. For example, both the principals charged with murder in the famous
Sacco-Vanzetti case had gone to Mexico during World War I to avoid military conscription.\(^{55}\)

In the last interview with W. G. Thompson before their execution, Vanzetti said “he feared that nothing but violent resistance could ever overcome the selfishness which was the basis of the present organization of society and made the few willing to perpetuate a system which enabled them to exploit the many”.\(^{56}\)

In his speech to the court on 9 April 1927, anarchist Vanzetti said: “....the jury were hating us because we were against the war, and the jury don’t know that it makes any difference between a man that is against the war because he believes that the war is unjust, because he hates no country, because he is a cosmopolitan, and a man that is against the war because he is in favour of the other country....and therefore, a spy, an enemy....We are not men of that kind....We were against the war because we did not believe in the purpose for which they say that war was fought. We believed that the war is wrong....We believe more now than ever that the war was wrong, and we are against war more now than ever, and I am glad to be on the doomed scaffold if I can say to mankind, ‘Look out....All that they say to you, all that they have promised to you—it was a lie, it was an illusion, it was a cheat, it was a fraud, it was a crime....’ Where is the moral good that the war has given to the world? Where is the spiritual progress that we have achieved from the war? Where is the security of life, the security of the things that we possess for our necessity? Where are the respects for human life? Where are the respect and the admiration for the good characteristics and the good of human nature? Never before the war as now have there been so many crimes, so much corruption, so much degeneration as there is now.”

Also included in the category of “selective nonviolence” are a number of individuals whose objection to participation in modern wars is not essentially an objection to violence \textit{per se}, but rather to authoritarianism in government, institutions and even individuals. They have thus refused to cooperate with military conscription and have received the consequences of such non-cooperation. Norman Thomas\(^{58}\) mentions a type of “conscientious objection by radicals (which) was based rather on an objection to conscription rather than to killing” and Case says: “A type of objector.....directs his protest against conscription in and of itself, without regard for the right or wrong of war in general or of the particular war in question.”\(^{59}\) Their objection is to ordering individuals around, as contrasted to allowing their free action and development. They may, however, use violence in their personal lives. Some of these oppose participation in modern war because they view it as an extreme development of both regimentation and violence.

Those individuals who now believe that preparations for nuclear war cannot under any conditions be justified, though they believe that war with earlier weapons has, at
least at times, been justified, are also included is this category of “selective nonviolence”.

PASSIVE RESISTANCE

Passive resistance is a method of conducting conflicts and achieving or thwarting social, economic or political changes. It is preferred to violent resistance, not for reasons of principle, but because either the resisters lack the means of violence or are not likely to win by such methods. The aim is to harass the opponent without employing physical violence, and to force him to make the desired concessions whether or not he desires to do so. Passive resistance may be used as a supplement to physical violence, as a preparation for it, following its unsuccessful use, or as a full substitute for physical violence. “Passive resistance” denotes actions which are not primarily self-initiated, motivated or directed, but instead are mainly reactions to the initiative of the opponent. The attitude of the resisters may involve hatred. They are not concerned in a major way with their own character, spiritual condition or way of living, but mainly in combating what they regard as a social evil.

“Passive resistance” may be practiced on the local, regional, national or international level. A large number of strikes, boycotts, and national non-cooperation movements are of this type of generic nonviolence. The latter include, for example, the Hungarian resistance against Austrian rule, 1850-1867, and Egyptian non-cooperation against British rule, 1919-1922. Other examples are strikes in the political prisoner camps in the Soviet Union, and the 1942 Norwegian teachers’ resistance which prevented the use of the schools for Nazi indoctrination and was the most important of several actions in halting Quisling's plans for instituting the Corporate State in Norway.

PEACEFUL RESISTANCE

“Peaceful resistance” is primarily a method of conducting conflicts and achieving or thwarting social, political or economic changes. In contrast to passive resistance, there is in it a relatively widespread recognition of nonviolent methods as being intrinsically better than violence and that they are exclusively the methods to be used in the struggle. Many, most, or even all, of the participants in “peaceful resistance” may adhere to a temporary nonviolent discipline only of the particular struggle. “Practical” considerations are still important. Nonviolent methods of resistance may be regarded as more likely to achieve the desired results than (1) violent resistance, (2) reliance on established governmental constitutional procedures, or (3) verbal persuasion without supporting action. But despite the limited nature of the adherence to nonviolence, a belief in the relative moral superiority of nonviolent over violent methods widely, and at times deeply,
permeates the resistance movements. A slight variation on this is that the use of nonviolent methods of resistance may be regarded as intrinsically more “democratic” than either violent resistance or passive acceptance of what are regarded as social evils; hence the nonviolent methods may also gain an aura of “rightness” on this ground.

A widespread belief among the resisters in the relative moral superiority of nonviolent methods may have several causes. Where there is a distinguishable leadership in the movement, such a belief may arise from one of three causes: (1) an important section of the leadership may be pacifist—that is, they may believe in nonviolence as a moral principle; (2) although none of the leaders may be pacifists, some or all of them may believe that nonviolent methods are considerably morally superior to violent methods and that violence should be used only in the most extreme conditions (not likely to arise during the struggle in question); or (3) both convinced pacifists and persons believing in the relative moral superiority of nonviolent methods may be among the leadership.

Two further factors may operate whether or not there is a distinguishable leadership (and, if there is in addition to one or other of the causes mentioned above). These are: (1) there may be among the resisters a sufficient number of pacifists to enable them, through numbers or disproportionate influence, to “colour” the struggle and help maintain it on a nonviolent basis even under severe provocation; and (2) the resisters may have been so repelled by previous experience of extreme social violence that they are determined to conduct this struggle without violence.

“Peaceful resistance” is generally more active than “passive resistance”. The degree of conscious use of strategy and tactics in peaceful resistance struggles may vary considerably. The “bias” in favour of nonviolent methods helps to keep the struggle nonviolent in spite of provocations and difficulties which might turn “passive resisters” to violence. This “bias” may also have certain social-psychological effects advantageous to the aims of the peaceful resistance movement. There is considerable variation in the degree to which peaceful resistance movements aim at changing the opponent’s attitudes and values as well as policies.

The best examples of peaceful resistance are the Montgomery, Alabama, 1955-57 bus boycott and the resistance campaigns led or inspired by Gandhi in which most of the resisters and even part of the leadership were following nonviolent methods only as a policy for achieving the objective of the struggle. Although almost none of the participants or leaders of the Montgomery Negroes’ bus boycott were avowed pacifists, the movement had a strong religious character. It was constantly emphasized that the nonviolent way was the Christian way, and that the Negroes should love the whites while refusing to ride the segregated buses.66
Nearly all of the resistance movements led or inspired by Gandhi are classified under “peaceful resistance”, although Gandhi’s satyagraha is recognized in this typology as one of the nine types of generic nonviolence. This is because of the very real differences between these struggles and Gandhi’s full approach. Gandhi called the types of nonviolence practiced in such resistance movements the “nonviolence of the weak” as contrasted to the “nonviolence of the brave” based on inner conviction. He believed that the former would achieve certain limited goals but its effect would not be so great as the latter’s. In his later years, Gandhi distinguished more sharply between these, saying that the “nonviolence of the weak” was not genuine satyagraha. These movements include, for example, the 1928 Bardoli peasants struggle and the 1930-31 independence struggle.

Other examples of “peaceful resistance” include: the 1952 South African “Defy Unjust Laws” campaign, the Korean resistance against Japanese oppression between 1919 and approximately 1921, the Samoan Islanders’ resistance against New Zealand rule from 1920 to 1936, the 1953 strike at Vorkuta prison camp by 250,000 political prisoners in the Soviet Union and the 1956 Japanese resistance against construction of a United States Air Force base at Sunakawa, Japan.

NONVIOLENT DIRECT ACTION

“Nonviolent direct action” is a method of producing or thwarting social, economic or political changes by direct nonviolent intervention aimed at establishing new patterns or policies or disrupting the institution of new patterns or policies regarded as undesirable or evil. The motivation of “nonviolent direct actionists” may vary from belief in nonviolence as a moral principle to adherence to a temporary nonviolent discipline as a practical method to achieve a particular objective. There is variation in the degree to which the act of intervention is intended to bring about a change in the opponent’s attitudes or values or simply to produce a change in the policy in question. The direct action may follow investigation of the facts, discussion with those responsible for the policy found objectionable, negotiations, public appeals and publicity about the grievance. An act of self-purification, such as prayer, fasting etc., may or may not precede the direct action.

Examples of nonviolent direct action include: (1) the 1924-25 Vykom “Satyagraha” in South India in which the direct actionists attempted to end the prohibition against Harijans’ (untouchables) using a road passing a Hindu temple by simply walking up it, and when halted by a police barricade, keeping vigil in shifts on the road day and night for fourteen months until allowed to proceed; (2) the Helegolanders' nonviolent seizure in 1951 of the island of Helegoland (off the coast of Germany) from the British Royal Air Force which had been using it for bombing target practice; (3) various projects of the Congress of Racial Equality against racial
segregation and discrimination in the U.S.A. in which mixed Negro-White groups have politely insisted on equal treatment for Negroes often by waiting for hours for service, admission, etc. in restaurants, theatres and public transportation until the policy was changed, or it was closing time, or they were arrested, and returning repeatedly until Negroes received equal treatment; and (4) the “nonviolent invasion” in Britain by supporters and members of the Direct Action Committee Against Nuclear War of the North Pickenham rocket base in December 1958, using such techniques as lying in front of trucks and obstructing the use of the concrete mixer in efforts to halt further construction.

SATYAGRAHA

Satyagraha is the type of generic nonviolence developed by Mohandas K. Gandhi. It means (approximately) “adherence to Truth” or “reliance on Truth”—Truth having the connotation of Essence of Being, or reality. The believer in Satyagraha, a satyagrahi, aims at attaining Truth through love and right action. Satyagraha is a matter of principle. It was developed by Gandhi through his searchings and experiments in his personal life, and his efforts at combating social evils and building a better social order. The satyagrahi seeks to “turn the searchlight inward” and to improve his own life so that he does no harm to others. He seeks to combat evil in the world through his own way of living, constructive work, and resistance and action against what are regarded as evils. He seeks to convert the opponent through sympathy, patience, truthfulness, and self-suffering. He believes that sufficient truthfulness, fearlessness and deep conviction will enable him to attack that which he regards as evil, regardless of the odds against him. He will not compromise on basic moral issues though he may on secondary matters. Gandhi left behind no systematized philosophical system. He dealt with practical problems as they arose and sought solutions for them within the context of his basic ethical principles: satya (truth) ahimsa (non-injury to living beings in thought, word and deed) and equality. The satyagrahi believes that means and ends must be equally pure. Gandhi regarded satyagraha as basically a matter of quality rather than quantity. When facing social conflict, he believed the satyagrahi’s own inner condition was more important than the external situation. A basic part of satyagraha in Gandhi’s view was a constructive program to build a new social and economic order through voluntary constructive work. This he regarded as more important than resistance. The Indian constructive program included a variety of specific measures aimed at social improvement, education, decentralized economic production and consumption, and improvement in the lot of the oppressed sections of the population. He believed that such a program gradually builds up the structure of a new nonviolent society, while resistance and
direct action are used to remove parts of the old structure which are obstacles to the new one.

When social evils require direct and active challenging, Gandhi believed, the various methods of peaceful resistance and nonviolent direct action (in the senses in which the terms are used in this paper) provide a substitute for rioting, violent revolution or war. Gandhi has made a unique contribution in combining nonviolence as a principle with the techniques and strategy of resistance, forging it into a method of meeting social conflicts which was regarded as more influential than both individual example and persuasion without such supporting action and the previous forms of nonviolent resistance. Investigation, negotiation, publicity, self-purification, temporary work stoppages, picketing, boycotts, non-payment of taxes, mass migration from the State, various forms of non-cooperation, civil disobedience and the fast (under strict limitations) are among possible methods of action. The satyagrahi is always ready to negotiate a settlement which does not compromise basic principles.

Gandhi became convinced that satyagraha based on inner conviction was more effective than non-violence practiced as a temporary policy. He said of the “nonviolence of the brave”: “It is such nonviolence that moves mountains, transforms life and flinches from nothing in its unshakable faith”. Satyagraha when developed by Gandhi became unique among the existing types of generic nonviolence by being a matter of principle, a program for social reconstruction and an active individual and group method of attacking what are regarded as social evils.

NONVIOLENT REVOLUTION

“Nonviolent revolution” is the most recent type of generic nonviolence. It is still very much a direction of developing thought and action, rather than a movement possessing a fixed ideology and program. “Nonviolent revolutionaries” believe that the major social problems of today’s world have their origins at the roots of individual and social life and, therefore, can be solved only by a basic, or revolutionary, change in individuals and society.

There is general recognition among believers in this approach of four aspects of a nonviolent revolutionary program: (1) improvement by individuals of their own lives, (2) gaining the acceptance of such values as nonviolence, equality, cooperation, justice and freedom as the determining values for the society as a whole, (3) building a more egalitarian, decentralized and libertarian social order, and (4) combating what are regarded as social evils by nonviolent resistance and direct action. A major objective of nonviolent revolution is to substitute nonviolent, cooperative, egalitarian relationships for such aspects of violence as exploitation, oppression and war. The nonviolent revolution is to be effected largely (in the view of some) or entirely (in the view of others) without use of the state machinery. Some advocates
of this approach place relatively more emphasis on achieving changes in policies, institutions, ownership, power relationship, etc., while others put relatively more emphasis on achieving changes in beliefs and attitudes as a preliminary to such social changes.

The nonviolent revolutionary approach has been developing at least since about 1945 in various parts of the world including Hong Kong, Germany, the United States, India and England. Nonviolent revolution has a mixed origin. This may, for the purposes of analysis, be roughly divided into those in which ideological factors are predominant and those in which they are subordinate to “practical” efforts to find solutions to certain pressing social problems. The “ideological” and “practical” factors are, however, never fully separated. On one hand, the ideologies concerned propose solutions for problems, and on the other, the search for solutions for such problems at some stage inevitably involves consideration of ideological approaches per se, or methods of action which are closely related to them. On the ideological level nonviolent revolution has been developing through the interplay and synthesis of several formerly distinct approaches. These include (1) certain types of pacifism, largely “moral resistance” and the Tolstoyan and Quaker approaches (“active reconciliation”), (2) Satyagraha and (3) ideologies of social revolution (i.e. basic social change), including the socialist, anarchist and & decentralist approaches. In some way satyagraha is the most important of these, largely because it combines a “pacifist” position with a method of resistance and revolution, thus serving as a bridge or catalyst between pacifism and social revolution.

On the “practical” level the nonviolent revolutionary approach has had origins in efforts to effect social, political or economic changes where parliamentary means are either non-existent or not responsive to popular control and where violent means are rejected either because the means of effective violent struggle are predominantly at the disposal of supporters of the status quo, or for other reasons. Nonviolent resistance and direct action have often appeared relevant in such situations. What seems to be an increasing reliance on nonviolent resistance and direct action by liberation movements is an illustration of this. Where nonviolent methods have been seriously used in such situations, there have often been ideological and programmatic consequences resulting from the combination of nonviolence and revolution. An associated factor in the development of nonviolent revolution is that common concern with pressing social problems (land in India, nuclear weapons in Britain, freedom in South Africa, for example) has brought pacifists, satyagrahis and social revolutionaries together to find and apply solutions for such problems. This interaction has contributed to the synthesizing of these approaches.
Because of the newness of this type of nonviolence, it is perhaps desirable to cite at
greater length than usual examples of the thought which underlies it. These citations,
largely from American and Indian sources, are to be regarded as only illustrative.

The Rev. Michael Scott has written: “There is the urgent need for a new revolutionary
movement which will have the courage and incentive to use methods of nonviolent
resistance not only against the manufacture of nuclear weapons but against
oppressive legislation and violations of human rights and natural justice”, and which
would be capable of a strong “effectual fight against oppression and injustice”,
ignorance and poverty.93

Although the nonviolent revolutionary movement has never developed in the United
States to anything approaching political significance, some of the clearest ideological
statements of this approach have come from that country. For example, in 1946
there existed a Committee for Nonviolent Revolution which issued this policy
statement:

We favour decentralized, democratic socialism guaranteeing worker-consumer
control of industries, utilities and other economic enterprises. We believe that the
workers themselves should take steps to seize control of factories, mines and shops.
....We believe in realistic action against war, against imperialism and against military
or economic oppression by conquering nations, including the United States. We
advocate such techniques of group resistance as demonstrations, strikes, organized
civil disobedience, and underground organization where necessary. As individuals we
refuse to join the armed forces, work in war industries, or buy government bonds,
and we believe in campaigns urging others to do similarly. We see nonviolence as a
principle as well as a technique. In all action we renounce the methods of punishing,
hating or killing any fellow human beings. We believe that nonviolence includes such
methods as sit-down strikes and seizure of plants. We believe that revolutionary
changes can only occur through direct action by the rank and file, and not by deals or
reformist proposals directed to the present political and labour leadership.94

A. J. Muste, in the period following the Committee for Nonviolent Revolution, was
the leading exponent of the nonviolent revolutionary approach: “....mankind faces a
major crisis. Only a drastic change, such as is suggested by the terms rebirth,
conversion, revolution, can bring deliverance. Tinkering with this or that piece of
political, economic or cultural machinery will not suffice....War and the war system,
as well as social violence, are inherent in our present politico-economic order and the
prevailing materialistic culture....War is not inevitable, though it is certain to come
unless a revolutionary movement against war and materialism soon comes into
existence.”95 “A nonviolent revolution changes external relationships and
managements but it is primarily an inner revolution, a rebirth of a man.”96“.....the
present period is a profoundly revolutionary one and its problem is a revolutionary
problem....This order is....bound to perish....because....the law of the universe that exploitation, hatred, tyranny are evil and cannot endure is being vindicated. Therefore, once again, as the ground is swept clear the chance to build a revolutionary new order presents itself to mankind....It is not our business to save either capitalism or Communism; either the Russian or the American power state; either the Western Capitalist culture or the present Communist culture. None of them now enshrines or allows for the flourishing of essentially democratic and humane values....in our age, whatever may have been the case in other periods.....violence must be rejected as a means for radical social change....Whether....we look at the problem of eliminating war or at the problem of radical social change (abolition of competitive nationalism, colonialism, dictatorship, feudalism, development of a non-exploitative economy, etc.) we must resort to nonviolence or we are lost. We need to build a nonviolent revolutionary movement....rooted firmly in local and national situations....not....abstract cosmopolitanism....[yet] genuinely internationalist in basis, composition and eventual structure.”

In India the nonviolent revolutionary approach has taken two forms, often regarded by their respective advocates as distinct. One is the bhudan (land-gift) and related movements led by Vinoba Bhave. The other is the emphasis on civil disobedience, most clearly espoused by Dr Rammanohar Lohia and his Socialist Party of India, but also advocated at times by the larger Praja Socialist Party and other groups. Concerning nonviolent revolution, Dr. Lohia has written: “Hitherto, in efforts to bring about major social changes, the world has known the sole alternatives of parliamentary and violent insurrectionary means. A reliance on only parliamentary means has often left people without any means of direct control over social decisions when Parliament was not responsive to the public will, and parliamentary means have sometimes proved incapable of bringing about genuinely fundamental changes in society when required. The reliance upon the means of violent insurrection has, however, also been proved inadequate. Even apart from considerations of the morality of violence and its chances of success, the kind of society produced by a violent insurrection does not recommend such means. Now, however, a new dimension has been added by the addition of individual and massive civil resistance as another way of bringing about major social changes....All those desirous of maintaining methods of nonviolence must learn to be equally loyal to revolution....Where such subordination of revolution to nonviolence takes place, conservative maintenance of the existing order is an inevitable result, just as chaos in the beginning and tyranny afterwards are inevitable results if nonviolence is subordinated to revolution....Mankind will ever hurtle from the hands of one irresponsibility into another if it continues to seek and organize its revolutions through violence.” Commenting on bhudan as a social revolution, the Indian
economist Gyan Chand has written: “The target of collecting 50 million acres before the end of 1957 for distribution among the landless labourers has not been realized, and more than half of the four million actually collected have still to be distributed. And yet the movement is gathering more steam, has made Gramdans—voluntary extinction of property rights in entire villages—its immediate objective and attained a large measure of success in realizing it....A real recluse [Vinoba] has left the seclusion of his ashram and is using his piety, spiritual communion and comprehension of life and its essence for bringing about basic social changes and undermining the status quo—the network of property relations, the institutional framework and the whole complex of views, conventions, attitudes and norms and patterns of behaviour. Religion is being brought into action as a revolutionary force, as a means of awakening the people to the inequalities of the present economic relations and the urgent need of replacing them by new relations based on a genuine community of feeling and quest for equality in status, income and assignment of functions....

“From the very beginning the bhudan movement has been a movement for establishing a new social order....The collection and distribution of land, it was....very clearly emphasized, was....only the first step, in a succession of changes which were implicit in the concept of social revolution. Among them, a classless society, extinction of property rights and the elimination of acquisitive social relations had necessarily to be given a very high priority in the list of the new social objectives. The gramdan concept brings these social objectives to the fore, stresses their primacy and urgency and points to the need of making them all-embracing and the basis of the whole production organization of the community. This means that if extinction of property rights in land is realized, the very logic of the step would make its application to trade, industry and services unavoidable....

“The movement, relying as it does exclusively on change through assent, that is, on a completely voluntary basis and by nonviolent methods, makes democracy its substance and essential feature. Experience is beginning to show that the movement is gathering momentum and the imminence of radical social changes is becoming more and more obvious and inescapable; and that vested interests....are likely to see in the movement a challenge and a danger and to use all their strength for defeating the processes that it has set in motion. This resistance has, according to the premises of the movement, to be met by janashakti—the people’s power—the power generated by the will to change and the support of the masses. If the full support of the people is mobilized through education and right guidance and can be sustained, it would create conditions for bringing into action the legislative power of the state in support of the people’s will to change. The movement does not in any way preclude legislative action, but does not put its faith in it as the primary or the major instrument of social change. The State has no doubt the organized might of the
community at its disposal, but if it is to be truly democratic it has to use this power as sparingly as possible and rely mainly on revolution from below—the upsurge and initiative of the people—for carrying out fundamental and social transformation.”

The incomplete nature of the ideology and program of nonviolent revolution is among the factors which have handicapped the spread of this type of generic nonviolence, especially in the West, but the general outline of its approach is sufficiently clear to justify its inclusion in this typology at this early stage of its development and to indicate that it may increase in prominence in the future.

Of these nine types of generic nonviolence, five fall within the definition of “pacifism” presented earlier in this paper; that is, their adherents refuse, on grounds of principle, participation in all international and civil wars and violent revolutions. These are: “non-resistance”, “active reconciliation”, “moral resistance”, “satyagraha”, and generally, “nonviolent revolution”. These involve a belief in the intrinsic value of nonviolence, as does also “peaceful resistance”. Six of the nine types of generic nonviolence emphasize the value of nonviolent behaviour as a method for achieving desired social objectives. These are: “moral resistance”, “passive resistance”, “peaceful resistance”, “nonviolent direct action”, “Satyagraha”, and “nonviolent revolution”. There is thus overlapping between these groups, with “moral resistance”, “peaceful resistance”, “satyagraha” and “nonviolent revolution” emphasizing both the intrinsic value of nonviolence and nonviolent behaviour as a method.

Of the nine types, the following always fall within the area of “nonviolent resistance and direct action”, as presented earlier in this paper: “passive resistance”, “peaceful resistance”, and “nonviolent direct action”. Often included also would be “moral resistance”, “Satyagraha” and “nonviolent revolution”. On some occasions believers in the approaches classified under “active reconciliation” and “selective nonviolence” might also undertake resistance which would fall within the scope of “nonviolent resistance and direct action”. On rare occasions, believers in “non-resistance” might feel compelled to non-cooperate with what they regard as evil in such a way that their behaviour would come within the scope of “nonviolent resistance”.

There are, of course, many other comparisons and contrasts which might be made among the nine types of generic nonviolence. Some of these will be suggested by the following chart which indicates in a brief way some of the main characteristics of the types of generic nonviolence. There are related questions which may arise in the minds of some readers, such as the relation between “persuasion”, “conversion” and “nonviolent coercion” among the types of generic nonviolence, or an analysis of the various techniques which are used in nonviolent resistance and direct action. These, however, require separate treatment and lie outside the scope of this paper.
The writer’s object has been simply to clarify, classify and define—and to illustrate these definitions, particularly where this may have been necessary to bring a sense of reality to descriptions of often relatively little known approaches. The writer does not regard this typology as perfect or final, but hopes that it may help in clarifying the existing confusion about these phenomena and may facilitate future study, research, analysis and evaluation of the various approaches within generic nonviolence.

The first version of this article was a chapter of the writer’s M.A. thesis in sociology: *Nonviolence: A Sociological Study* (Ohio State University, 1951). A slightly popularised revision appeared in *Mankind* (Hyderabad), December 1956, under the title ‘A Typology of Nonviolence’. A pamphlet reprint of this, under the title *The Meaning of Nonviolence*, was issued in 1957 by Housemans Bookshop, London. The writer then made several major changes and additions, included documentation and completely re-wrote the paper. This revision was published in the American *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, March 1959, under the title “The Meanings of Nonviolence: A Typology”. The present version is a further revision containing some new documentation, a more extensive introduction, and statements and descriptions illustrating the respective types of nonviolence within the text itself.

**SOURCES**

1. “Nonviolence” in this paper refers to the absence of physical violence against human beings. Fuller definitions are offered in subsequent sections.
3. “Pacifists” here refers to persons and groups refusing participation in war on ethical, moral or religious grounds.
5. For example, the U.S. conscription law provides for alternatives to military duty for those objecting to it because of religious belief and training, but denies such alternatives to objectors whose pacifism arises from a personal philosophy, humanitarianism, or social, economic or political views.
6. Military conscription laws throughout the world vary concerning provisions for objectors. Many make no provisions for exemption from military duty or alternative civilian duty. Some include either or both provisions for objectors establishing their sincerity. Still others provide either or both provisions only for certain objectors, such as “religious” ones.
7. As will be indicated below, the term “nonviolence” is used in a much broader sense in this paper than it was by Gandhi.
8. Satyagraha will be defined below.
18. For example, nonviolent resistance with mixed motives of principle and expediency, and groups rejecting international wars but not necessarily personal violence.
19. For example, including William Lloyd Garrison’s approach under “satyagraha and nonviolent direct action”.
20. “Generic nonviolence” and “nonviolence” for the purposes of this typology have thus a much broader meaning than that given to “nonviolence” by Gandhi and certain other votaries of nonviolence. Gandhi often referred to nonviolence as being essentially the same as love. It was ahimsa, which involved non-injury in thought, word and deed to all living things. It rejected ill-will and hatred as well as physical violence. For clarity, the new term “generic nonviolence” will be used hereafter in this paper, now that the subject area has been introduced.
21. “Nonviolent direct action” is discussed as a type of generic nonviolence below in the typology.
22. This classification is similar to Hiller’s category, the “generic strike”: “This [the generic strike] includes the labour strike, the social boycott, political non-cooperation, demonstrations against official acts, and other similar group conflicts. These various forms of non-participation, although differing in the occasions from which they arise and the ends which they seek, are essentially similar in their methods of coercion and collective control.” (E.T. Hiller, *The Strike: A Study in Collective Action*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1928, p. 41.) “Non-participation which is designed to interfere with official acts most frequently takes the form of a refusal to share in the prescribed institutional activities or to participate in political affairs. Occasionally it may involve a suspension of labour.” (*Ibid.*, p. 234.)
23. There is no type labelled “conscientious objection” or “war resistance”, as such objection or resistance is a specific application of several of the types of generic nonviolence included here.
24. In this revision the writer has tried to offer terminology and definitions which, if adopted, might reduce future confusion in the literature. This has involved making refinements in the existing terminology while seeking to use such terms in ways harmonious with present general usage. Hence, the broader, intermediary classes of “pacifism” and “nonviolent resistance and direct action”. Hence, also, the use of the terms “non-resistance”, “passive resistance”, “satyagraha” and “nonviolent revolution” in ways having clear precedents (although the writer is aware the first two have also been widely used with varying connotations). It has seemed necessary to coin new terms, such as “generic nonviolence”, and “selective nonviolence” and to give more specific meanings to “moral resistance” and “peaceful resistance”. The writer does not regard this terminology as perfect, but in the absence of an alternative suggests its adoption. The final solution to the terminological problem may lie in creating entirely new terms, such as Gandhi did with satyagraha; the difficulties in gaining their general
acceptance, however, might be greater than those of accepting the terms and definitions offered in this paper.

25. This order is inevitably somewhat arbitrary; the most active expression of one type may exceed inactivity the most passive expression of the type(s) listed after it.


29. Quoted in Case, op. cit., p. 136f.


34. Ibid., p. 306f.

35. See Hershberger, op. cit.


39. These societies were often called “non-resistance” societies. This is one of the cases where a single term in this field has been used with a variety of meanings. The term “non-resistance” was also used by Tolstoy in a sense which differs from the “non-resistance” type as defined in this article. Adin Ballou, although using the term “non-resistance”, makes it clear he advocates a moral resistance to evil.


46. Some of the Socialists were objectors to all forms of social violence. Whether U.S. Socialist leader, Eugene V. Debs would have used violent means for the socialist revolution is problematical. His statements on this are sometimes contradictory.


52. Quoted from the official statement of belief that appears regularly in *The Watch Tower*, official publication of the Witnesses. Quoted by Stroup, *op. cit.*, p. 139. For a brief, but fuller, account of this conception, see the excerpt from the decision in an Appellate Court of South Africa, quoted in Stroup,*op. cit.*, p. 140f.


61. See, for example, Harry IV. Laidler, *Boycotts and the Labour Struggle: Economic and Legal Aspects* (New York, John Lane Co., 1918) p. 7-166.


64. See the *Information Bulletin of the International Commission Against Concentration Camp Practices*(Brussels), No. 4, August-November 1955. Paul Barton (*Ibid.*) reports that the situation of political prisoners in the Soviet Union has been “greatly eased”, partly as a result of general reforms, says Barton, but, “the conscious and systematic action of the political prisoners, particularly of their leaders, is largely responsible”. The 1953 strike at Vorkuta is classified under “peaceful resistance” because of the close association of religious pacifists (the Monashki) with that particular struggle.

also associated with this teachers’ struggle, but not in such a way as to permeate into
the struggle an aura of the moral superiority of nonviolent over violent methods of
resistance, or in sufficient numbers as to warrant its classification under “peaceful
resistance”.

See, for example, “Attack on Conscience”, Time, 18 February 1957, p. 13-16; Dr Martin
Luther King, “Our Struggle”, Liberation (New York), April 1956, p. 3-6;―, “We Are Still
Walking”, ibid., December 1956, p. 6-9; Dr Homer Jack, “U.S. Negroes in Mass
December 1956, p. 1; Dr Martin Luther King, Stride Toward Freedom; The Montgomery

66. For further discussion of the “nonviolence of the weak” and the “nonviolence of the
brave”, see, for example, Gopi Nath Dhawan, The Political Philosophy of Mahatma
Gandhi (Bombay, The Popular Book Depot, 1945) p. 67f.; Nirmal Kumar Bose, Selections
From Gandhi (Ahmedabad, Navajivan Publishing House, 1948) p. 123f.: and various
passages in Gandhi, Nonviolence in Peace and War (Ahmedabad, Navajivan Publishing

67. In his later years Gandhi sometimes called this “nonviolence of the weak” by the term
“passive resistance”. For example, in July 1947, Gandhi said: “....our nonviolence was
of the weak. But the weak of heart could not claim to represent any nonviolence at all.
The proper term was passive resistance” (ibid., Vol. II, p. 272). Two factors, however,
cause the writer to classify these campaigns under “peaceful resistance” rather than
“passive resistance”: the degree of activity in these struggles and the degree to which
belief in the moral superiority of nonviolent methods permeated them. Gandhi,
February 1946: “....if the truth is told as it must be, our nonviolent action has been
half-hearted. Many have preached nonviolent action through the lips while harbouring
violence in the breast...” (ibid., p. 30). Gandhi, December 1947 (summary of a post-
prayer address)“He had admitted that it was not nonviolence of the brave that India
had practiced. But whatever it was, it had enabled a mighty nation of forty crores
[400,000,000] to shake off the foreign yoke without bloodshed. It was the freedom of
India that had brought freedom to Burma and Ceylon. A nation that had won freedom
without the force of arms should be able to keep it too without the force of arms”
(ibid., p. 340).

68. See Mahadev Desai, The Story of Bardoli (Ahmedabad, Navajivan Publishing House,
1929) ix, 363 p.

69. See, for example, Louis Fischer, The Life of Mahatma Gandhi (New York, Harper and
Brothers, 1950) p. 262-275; D. G. Tendulkar, Mahatma: Life of Mohandas Karamchand
Bhogaraju Pattabhi Sitaramayya, The History ofthe Indian National Congress (Madras,


71. See Bart. de Ligt, The Conquest of Violence (New York, E.P. Dutton & Co., 1938) p. 149-
153; Brockway, op. cit., p. 40-70; F.A. McKenzie, Korea’s Fight for Freedom (London,
Simpkin, Marshal, 1920) 320 p.; Henry Chung, The Case of Korea (London, Allen and
Unwin, 1922) 367 p.

72. See de Ligt, op. cit., p. 147-153; de Ligt cites further references on p. 149 and 153.

73. For an account of this strike organized by the combined efforts of Leninist
revolutionaries, Monashkis(religious pacifists) and anarchists, see Brigitte Gerland, “My
XIX, Nos. 3 to 10. For accounts of contrasting strikes in other camps in which
the Monashki did not play a major role, see Information Bulletin of the International Commission Against Concentration Camp Practices, No. 4, August-November 1955.

74. See, for example, Shingo Shibata, “Japanese Air Base Defiance Campaign” Peace News, 26 October 1956, p. 1; “10,000 Stop Air-Base Extension Plan”, ibid., 1 March 1957, p. 3.

75. “Satyagraha” here refers to the campaign with nonviolent methods, as this has been widely known as the Vykom Satyagraha, rather than to Gandhi’s over-all philosophy. See footnote 82.


80. In India the term satyagrahi has been used both to describe the person believing in satyagraha as a matter of principle, and those persons participating in the resistance campaigns who were acting under a temporary discipline. Likewise, the term satyagraha has been used both to describe Gandhi’s full belief system, and to describe resistance movements which he led or are more or less patterned after the methods he used and advocated. This ambiguity in the use of these terms may be too deeply rooted in Indian literature to be corrected, but the writer suggests that in future analysis elsewhere, it might facilitate clarity if the term satyagrahi were restricted to those sharing the belief system, and the term “civil resister” used to describe those participating in campaigns under a temporary nonviolent discipline. Likewise, satyagraha might be used to describe campaigns involving “civil resisters”. Dr Joan Bondurant (in her book, Conquest of Violence: The Gandhian Philosophy of Conflict, Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1958) has suggested instead that the term satyagraha be used to describe those types of nonviolent resistance which have certain qualities, especially consideration for the opponent as an individual. Without desiring to impose a solution to the terminological confusion, the present writer expresses the hope that Dr Bondurant’s, his, and others’ suggested solutions will be considered in order that the confusion may be ended.

81. Discussion of resistance movements led by satyagrahis with participation of others under a temporary discipline of nonviolent behaviour is discussed above under the heading “peaceful resistance”.

82. Dhawan, op. cit., p. 67f,

84. An exception to this fourth aspect is Vinoba Bhave who favours “gentler” forms of nonviolence than those used by Gandhi in the Indian independence struggles.

85. Clarence Marsh Case (*Nonviolent Coercion: A Study in Methods of Social Pressure*, New York, The Century Co., 1923, p. 277-280) describes the beginnings of the synthesizing of the religious pacifist and the social radical approaches as early as World War I in the United States, although it is clear that this process has become socially significant only since 1945.

86. See various issues of *Chu Lieu (Main Current)*, issued from Kowloon by the Chulieu Society, Professor Lo Meng Tze, Chmn.


88. Examples of the developing thought in the nonviolent revolutionary approach in the United States, India and England are offered below.

89. An important step in this synthesis was made in the United States during World War II as religious pacifists and non-religious social radicals—finding themselves thrown together in conscientious-objector camps and prisons—began to expand their thinking and convictions beyond the previous limits recognised by these groups. A writer in the journal *Manas* comments on this development (“The New Men”, *Manas*, (Los Angeles) 28 March 1956, Vol. IX, No. 13, p. 7).

90. Some would view nonviolent revolution as an application of *Satyagraha* to a new historical situation. Gandhi’s later thinking included an emphasis on radical social, economic and political changes. For example, in June 1942, Gandhi said that in a free India, “The peasants would take the land. We would not have to tell them to take it” (Louis Fischer, *A Week With Gandhi*, New York, Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1942, p. 54). Gandhi, May 1947: “There can be no Ramarajya [Kingdom of God] in the present state of iniquitous inequalities in which a few roll in riches and the masses do not get even enough to eat” (Gandhi, *Nonviolence in Peace and War*, Vol. II, p. 255.) Gandhi, 1945: “…if we have democratic Swaraj [Self-rule]....the Kisans [peasants] must hold power in all its phases, including political power” (Bose,*Studies in Gandhism*, p. 79.)

91. Or other combinations of these, as pacifists and social revolutionaries, or satyagrahis and social revolutionaries. Pacifists in such cases are likely to be familiar with the methods of nonviolent resistance and direct action.


**SOME MAIN CHARACTERISTICS* OF THE TYPES OF GENERIC NONVIOLENCE**
03. NOTES ON THE THEORY OF NONVIOLENCE
William Robert Miller

How many of the books and articles that have been published concerning pacifism and non-violence are without a very considerable degree of propagandistic, apologetic material? Author after author is concerned to provide a “basis” for pacifism or for nonviolence—and very often this is provided in something approaching a casuistical style that varies from one author to the next. A very interesting paper could be written, dealing with nothing else than the ideological (and theological) varieties themselves. Perhaps the reason is that almost the only writers in this field have a very impelling commitment to their subject which makes them tend to argue for it and erect defences against criticisms of it. The few who are not in this position are usually counter-ideologues, whose only concern is to debunk non-violence or pacifism from the standpoint of another ideology to which they likewise are committed. There is little if any objective and disinterested research devoted to presenting the whole picture and seriously analyzing the successes or failures of historic instances of non-violence or pacifism or debating theoretical points. (Hebrews 6:1 is relevant to this matter: “Therefore let us leave the elementary doctrines of Christ and go on to maturity, not laying again a foundation of repentance from dead works and of faith towards God”). The context of this passage is set by the preceding verses, 5:11-14, which have to do with the unreadiness of some Christians to assume leadership: “At a time when you should be teaching others”, paraphrases J. B. Phillips, “you need teachers yourself to repeat to you the ABC of God’s revelation to men”). Frequently this seems to be the case with those who espouse pacifism and nonviolence; they tirelessly cover and recover the same elementary foundations in the same uncritical frame of mind. In the authors themselves there is frequently an unwillingness to engage in the necessary intellectual conflict with their co-thinkers which might clarify issues and raise important problems for solution. Consequently the issues are muddied and the problems glossed over in an attitude of charitableness that might better be reserved for the critics of pacifism and nonviolence. These latter are seldom accorded the kindly respect shown to the co-thinker, but are rudely dismissed as obstacles to the onward march of truth. But authentic maturity will be attained only as we learn to relax in the fundamental presuppositions of our faith and entertain theoretical doubts and assume the role
of a devil’s advocate who is more than a straw man. It is so easy for us to discover the rationalizations and ideological and psychological and motivational distortions in our opponent’s thinking, and so hard to see these in ourselves; and it is likewise hard for us to recognize, concede and come meaningfully to grips with the solid criticisms that confront us.

PASSIVE RESISTANCE

In a letter published in *Harijan*, 7 December 1947, Gandhi says: “Europe mistook the bold and brave resistance full of wisdom by Jesus of Nazareth for passive resistance, as if it was of the weak….Has not the West paid heavily in regarding Jesus as a Passive Resister.” Gandhi is here making a distinction between passive resistance and nonviolent resistance which, it seems to me, clouds the issue with emotion. Taking “nonviolence” or ahimsa as the generic term, I think it is possible to discern at least three types of action compatible with this attitude: (1) nonresistance; (2) passive resistance; and (3) non-violent action.

The plain meaning of the words is there if we would only take elementary care with their philological components. Resistance, in the usual sense, simply means to withstand, oppose, stand firm against something, to block it or push it back. The Latin root components are *re*-(back) and *sistere*, the causative of *stare* (to stand). This word includes the whole gamut of possible (and impossible) methods of resistance, which remain to be stated. Resistance can be real or false, mental or physical, pugilistic or armed, civil or military, violent or nonviolent—and this list by no means exhausts the possible qualifying adjectives that may be applied. Non-resistance is, clearly, the absence of all these—unless, as is frequently the case with negations, only a certain class of connotations is meant to be excluded. As customarily used, “non-resistance” refers to overt actions. He who practices non-resistance in this sense may very well oppose an adversary in his will and spirit, but does not present any overt obstacle to the action to which resistance would be a possible response. It might be pertinent here to ask: how does non-resistance differ from acquiescence or collaboration? The distinction lies in the connotation: the non-resister may well acquiesce in the action that is being done, but it is not a willing acquiescence. “Do not resist evil” does not mean, “Be complacent when evil is done”, though it could mean, “Keep your resistance to yourself let it remain unacted and restricted to the spiritual realm”. It cannot ethically mean to give tacit endorsement to evil. “Non-resistance” therefore is an ambiguous term which
carries within itself a contradiction of meanings that must be kept in fragile balance. Part, at least, of this ambiguity will be resolved at the linguistic level if we observe the force of the prefix “non” as contrasted with “un”. To be non-resistant implies a purposiveness that does not apply to being un-resistant. Parenthetically, we should note that different languages have different structures and the manner in which such distinctions are made will vary according to the language.¹

“Passive resistance” is perhaps a better word, a less ambiguous word for what is implied by the connotative use of the word “non-resistance”. And yet because of the currency of “non-resistance”, it has acquired its own connotations. The noun is positive and denotes action of some kind. How can an action be “passive”? In a broad sense, “non-resistance” could mean running away or otherwise evading the conflict implied in resistance of any kind. (Perhaps such action could be designated “unresistance”.) Even so, this could be a form of resistance if it thereby thwarts or frustrates the action that has been presented. In fine, the distinguishing characteristic of non-resistance must be that it does not attempt to thwart the action itself. Jesus was nonresistant when he was sentenced to death, and his non-resistance is supremely evident in his “acquiescence” in the suffering he endured on the cross. He did not seek to avoid the consequences of the evil actions of his persecutors, and indeed entered death with forgiveness for them, which says something profound about the nature of a non-resistance which is not an end in itself but a corollary to agapic love. That is, a further connotation is here introduced—we might speak of “redemptive non-resistance” or “loving non-resistance” or “Christian non-resistance”. There is a similar, though not identical, implication in the Hindu concept of ahimsa, or non-harm, considered in all its aspects but with particular emphasis on the spiritual. To speak of “embittered non-resistance” or “hateful non-resistance” is to suggest the absurdity of omitting the spiritual connotations derived from the Gospel and from the Hindu doctrines. At the same time, let us not be too quick to suppose that it is impossible for non-resistance to be corrupted by unredemptive, unloving or un-Christian attitudes. There is no type of social or personal relation which cannot be emptied of spiritual content and rendered demoniac. Even the best of them can be perverted through divorcement from the divine spirit that breathes life into them. Gene Sharp has attempted a typology of non-violence which is in many ways useful if somewhat
speculative. He lists nine separate types of “generic non-violence”, in order of “increasing activity”, beginning with non-resistance and ending with “non-violent revolution”. Unfortunately, the nature of activity is unspecified—the term itself is perhaps too broad—but what is neglected most crucially, it seems to me, is the dimension of depth. In certain situations, non-resistance, embraced in spirit and in truth, may count for more, both in principle and in a strategic sense, than a sweeping non-violent revolution that may be shallow and demoniac. To the extent that his categories are themselves valid, they beg for a more than unilinear treatment and need to be seen in the light of each of several other factors: stability, tactical adaptability, spiritual depth, social velocity, chances of organic growth, and relevance a given existential situation.

What, then, is “passive resistance”? Surely it must be a form action which is not overt in the way it opposes. It seeks to block the action in some way short of actively opposing it. Paradoxically, it may be a form of running away from the conflict which does not let the initial action continues unchanged. If non-resistance means remaining in the situation and yielding to its demands, passive resistance must mean thwarting these demands by altering the situation in some way, either within it or by withdrawal.

Passive resistance is likely to be defensive in both its tactics and its strategy, and to involve forms of non-cooperation that embarrass rather than coerce. It means directly altering one’s own behaviour but not directly impeding that of the opponent. If non-resistance “goes along with” the opponent, absorbing the latter’s aggression and offering no counteraction, passive resistance is a way that refuses to go along with the opponent but chooses routes of action which tactically disengage the resister from the direct point of conflict. It may overtly acquiesce in the opponent’s terms, but its strategic effect is so to change the terms of the conflict that the opponent, for his own reasons and not because of any overt impediment, is led to initiate change. The boycott or withdrawals of patronage, the walk-out aspect of a strike—these are types of passive resistance. In these actions, the resister simply removes himself from engagement with his opponent at the point where the opponent relies upon the resister’s reciprocal action to complete his own action. A factory cannot produce goods without the action of its workers. If they cease their productive action, the management of the factory is deprived of an indispensable element in the process of production. If bus riders
passively refuse to ride buses, the buses will go empty and the bus company’s revenues will be curtailed in proportion to the effectiveness of the boycott. The next step is up to the factory or the bus company, which must either come to terms with the resisters or replace them or force them to come back. But it must do something to regain control of the situation.

The Montgomery bus boycott is an example of passive resistance, and a famous one. Unfortunately it is, properly considered, an unsuccessful example, since the boycott was brought to a conclusion by a court decision which had nothing to do with the boycott itself.  

Passive resistance is a form of resistance which is non-violent, and for this reason it is often used interchangeably with “nonviolent resistance”. But not all kinds of non-violent resistance are passive. If we said “active resistance”, we would make clear the distinction of “active” versus “passive”, but would thereby reopen the question of violence which is ruled out in the term “passive”. Therefore, “nonviolent resistance” connotes a type of conduct which is active as non-violent. In this, the resister seeks directly to thwart his opponent’s conduct by his own, and this implies offensive tactics. A tactic of nonviolent action in the Montgomery situation, for example, would have been for the Negroes to have taken seats reserved for whites on the buses. But is this really “resistance”? There is so much of a positive, assertive character in this action that it raises a question about the appropriateness of the word “resistance” in this context. This question has to do with a difference between strategy and tactics. In military affairs, offensive tactics may be employed as subordinate parts of a strategy of withdrawal, with one unit advancing against enemy positions in order to facilitate the retreat of other units. Similarly, a tactical withdrawal may be a necessary part of a strategic advance. These are matters of technique which are separate from the issues of the conflict, though they undoubtedly have their moral aspect, their interior questions of economy of means, military ethics and so forth. Likewise with nonviolence. Nonviolent “resistance” is morally a combat against evil, but it is also morally for good. Both resistance and affirmation are modes of the same kind of action in tactics and strategy, and are defined largely by the extent of opposition such action encounters. The same action may be tactically resistant and strategically affirmative or vice versa. Since “resist” implies response to a prior or present action, when such action is absent, we cannot speak of resistance—but there are
certainly cases in which action can be initiated which is nonviolent and which, evoking a hostile response, will become tactically resistant.

**IS NONVIOLENCE “CHRISTIAN”?**

Some exponents of non-violence make the claim that it is “the way of the Cross”, while its opponents frequently point out: (a) that in the personal love-ethic of Jesus, as demonstrated in his teachings (especially the Sermon on the Mount), the standard is not resistance of any kind but self-sacrificing non-resistance; and (b) that this love-ethic is inapplicable to society, so that types of coercion must be responsibly used by Christians to whom are entrusted the welfare of society. The dichotomy thus described is between absolutism, Utopianism, perfectionism, etc. on the one hand, and on the other hand, relativism, relevance, realism, etc. More specifically, the split is characterized by the former’s insistence upon Christ as the norm to which all things are to be subordinated, whatever the cost and with the consolation that one’s conduct is good in the sight of God and in the “long run” of history, even when its immediate viability is the indispensable criterion of action, even if this means the deferment of efforts at Christlike conduct in society to the unforeseeable future or to “the end of history”. In between these extremes there is room, I think, for recognition of the fact that nonviolence is a relativization or adulteration of Gospel non-resistance which is, in many instances at least, viable in the social order. That is, nonviolence is not a perfect expression of the Christian love-ethic but more closely approximates it than violence does. The Christian who absolutely rejects violence may readily avail himself of nonviolent methods of coercion and persuasion, finding in them a context in which to work for a greater expression of redemptive and reconciling love. The relativist or realist, who may be willing and ready to use violence for the same redemptive purposes (a motive too little appreciated by his critics, who often see its failure in practice), may also avail himself of nonviolence as one of several varieties of action that are open to him—and one which, other things being equal, is to be preferred for its greater compatibility with the teachings of Jesus. After all, it would be a perverse and wholly un-Christian kind of “realism” which could insist that armed force is always the preferable means for the solution of social conflict.

**NONVIOLENCE AND RELEVANCE**

There is a certain interpenetration of the two approaches to nonviolence indicated above that is reflected in the interior problems of each. Here I want to consider
how this affects the person who embraces non-violence from the viewpoint of a prior commitment to abstain from violence. There is a temptation to think of nonviolence as a panacea (and for the realist there is the temptation to reject it as this and nothing more) which, if applied to any situation, is sure to bring the desired solution. But it is possible (and I think important and necessary) to reject this view as wishful thinking—without necessarily therefore rejecting nonviolence as a commitment. There are two distinct questions involved here. The first is: shall I be non-violent in all circumstances? This is a question of personal commitment, and the possible answers are yes or no. The second is: is nonviolent action viable in all circumstances? The answer here has to do with results; it is not a subjective but an objective question, and the answer has to do with facts rather than will or intention. I may decide, in a given situation, to act in a certain way because of a faith or presupposition that this is the only right or honourable way to act. What constitutes effective, consequential action at that moment is another matter. The realist is also affected, if less noticeably, by this. A soldier who may have no compunctions about killing, may hold off from a certain kind of killing (e.g., torture, killing unarmed civilians) which might effect the solution to his problem but at a moral cost which transcends (or at least morally blocks) any gain that might be perceived.

Moreover, some types of action, whether violent or nonviolent, may have so little visible chance of success that they are virtually suicidal and yet are not necessarily contemptible for that reason. On the contrary, we admire the valiant man who risks certain death for the sake of his beliefs—particularly if we share those beliefs, but even if we are at enmity with him. For this very reason we despise the man who proposes a risky course of action and personally flinches from the consequences—the man who counsels heroism and martyrdom for others but seeks safety for himself. And for the same reason we lack respect for the man who so little values his life or his cause that he will vaingloriously dispose of it to no purpose either of witness or of achievement. Sometimes our attitude may be complex: we can appreciate the personal courage of the men who died in the battle of the Little Big Horn, at the Alamo or at San Juan Hill or in the charge of the Light Brigade—while reflecting that in history these were the wrong places and the wrong causes at which and for which to give one’s life—all imperialist ventures.
Our criteria of judgement are not unilateral unless our concern is unilaterally for nonviolence at all costs, courage at all costs, etc.

It is, after all, this elevation of a partial value to the position of absolute supremacy which is the offence called idolatry. The demands of the Christian faith are be no means fulfilled in the mere abstention from violence, even if this is taken to be a cardinal and indispensable element of it—and the same is true if one takes courage or freedom or truth or any other God-given value and sets it up as a god in itself. What kind of love is it that is unconcerned for the justice it has to fulfill and transcend? Or that affirms fellowship with the enslaved without moving to free them? Or that embraces truth in the abstract but shrinks from it in the concrete?

It is because none of these separate absolutes will suffice as faithful service to God that dilemmas arise for even the most devout Christian—and indeed can be avoided only by those whose faith is in some way defective. The Christian way is a dynamic of inner attitude and outward action. “Good works” without the energizing force of faith are “dead”—they can at best produce only an illusion of redemption. On the other hand, a perhaps more subtle question: what is the value of faithful intentions that find no means of access to the world and merely exist in the bosom of the individual? These are the intentions that wait for the propitious moment that never comes—the intentions with which the “road to hell” is paved. For the Christian life consists in the deepening of the well-springs of action, not their substitution by purely private states of mind. Yet there is sufficient ambiguity in men’s actions; and in saints like Paul of Tarsus and Francesco d’Assisi there is enough of that ambiguity to require the sustenance of God’s grace—and in our own times we can find faults in such men as Bonhoffer and Gandhi to prove that sainthood is not divinity.

It may bear repetition that the Christian who is committed to non-violence has not thereby fulfilled the demands of his faith. In a sense, these demands are so hard and so high that no Christian nor any mortal man can fulfill them. But humanly speaking, within the bounds of what you or I may do by God’s grace, there is at least a tempo we can reach a limit of usable strength, beyond the realm of half-heartedness. Man cannot legitimately aspire to be God, but he can often extend and deepen his ways of serving Him in faithful discipleship. Violence is only one of the evils in the world, and the violence of war is only one of the forms of violence.
The task of the Christian is not only to abstain from violence but to overcome it. The only Christian justification for the “realist’s” use of violence is his hope of thereby staving off and eventually overcoming another kind of violence or evil which he considers worse—and it is in this that his “relativism” consists, and on the ambiguities of which he is so frequently impaled, since it is often problematical to determine which violence is worse, that which one seeks to counter or that which one uses (and the temptation, of course, is to minimize the latter).

This much is clear, then. Nonviolence cannot be Christianly used to dodge responsibility; its God-given function is not evasive but redemptive. The exponent of nonviolence cannot just “mind his own business” and fulfill his faith merely by engaging in nonviolence when violence happens to cross his path. Like every aspect of Christian faith, preachment has to be rooted in practice and practice in the world—not just the world that impinges upon our everyday activities and not just the remote world of nations and continents, but the world as a structure of human community in all its ramifications. We do not fulfill our faith either by isolated acts of human kindness toward individuals or by “keeping informed” about international affairs, “supporting the UN”, etc., though each of these has its place. There is great merit in social action which involves the individual Christian with numbers of people in ways that ask more of him than a monetary contribution, for community is one of the dimensions of Christian faith. This, incidentally, is a characteristic of non-violent action.

But let us return to the earlier question of nonviolence as a panacea, having made it clear that nonviolence must be meshed with concern for injustice, that it must be accompanied by an affirmation of love that is not abstract but partaking of community concern. Must it then succeed in order to be valid? If it fails, must its failure invariably be attributed to unfavourable circumstances? I think there must be situations in which nonviolence is bound to fail and yet has an intrinsic value that may be socially irrelevant, but which still stands in the personal relation of a man to his comrades and to his God. Situations are bound to arise in which one’s witness is wholly lost to the world, yet it is not lost to God. In a Nazi concentration camp a man perished. He would still have perished no matter what he did, whether he bowed and scraped before his oppressors or whether he revolted in the effort to kill as he was being killed. No one knew of his action. Or if they did, perhaps they misinterpreted its intent in a dozen ways. Still, he himself knew and
God knew, and in that private and holy relation he died true to his faith. Such a fate surely is not to be scorned, even if it is totally irrelevant to society, to history or to another human being, alive or dead. In the same category, though less absolute, is the man who could have helped another man only at the cost of his own faith. This is a delicate situation, and we must be careful not to prejudice it by injecting corollary suppositions. Suffice it to say that each of us can imagine some act so debasing that no situation could require it as the price of doing “good” to a fellow human being. I do not believe it is necessary to examine further hypothetical situations to establish my point, that there are grounds besides social relevance for right conduct—in this case, nonviolence—that may or may not also be potentially relevant to other human beings.

What I want to insist upon is that actions have both personal and social meanings and value and while the two may be hard to disentangle in practice, it is necessary to distinguish them for purposes of understanding and evaluation.

THE SCOPE OF NONVIOLENCE
The word “non-violence” has both intended and possible meanings. The word is intended to represent types of conduct that are purposively lacking in violence. Within this meaning it is further desirable to distinguish between nonviolence of conduct, of attitude, of spirit, etc. There may be some inner ambiguity on these points which the word itself only potentially resolves. This interior range of meaning is a legitimate subject of debate, the a priori assumption being that nonviolence per se should (if it does not necessarily) imply the complete configuration of action, attitude, spirit, etc. But at the other extreme, the exterior boundary of meaning, it should be made clear that actions from which violence is gratuitously absent are not therefore “nonviolent”. Many people in many situations prefer and often choose responses that do not involve violence. For lack of a better term, let us call this kind of action “unviolent” rather than “nonviolent”. Sometimes in making distinctions between the two, in cases where motivation is not clear, we shall have to resort to empirical and arbitrary choice of words. But let us at least be clear beforehand that there are these two distinctly different types of action which are not violent.

CRITERIA OF SUCCESS
How often have the participants in a nonviolent campaign pronounced their efforts a “success” because they received favourable publicity? Sometimes the latter may
consist of nothing so much as a local newspaper’s editorial defending their elementary constitutional liberties or commending their motives despite disapproval of the campaign itself. Or it may be that a passer-by smiled or gave a word of encouragement. By what criteria do these evidences of limited support or bare tolerance constitute success for the campaign? Nonviolence is based on “adherence to truth”, by which is meant not only a transcendent metaphysical concept finally, as with Gandhi, coterminous with God, but also a very down-to-earth concern for factual accuracy, open dealing with the actual even when it is unpleasant. Among other things, adherence to truth must mean the absence of any trace of falsification, whether through exaggeration, warped or prejudicial assessment or reporting, excessive modesty or simply tireless inattention to details.

SOURCES

1. Herbert Read, in his *Anarchy and Order* (London: Faber, 1954), p. 162 f., remarks on some of the philosophical consequences of the fact that the two English words “liberty” and “freedom” are both translated as the same word in French and German, respectively *liberte* and *Freiheit*, necessitating the use of qualifying adjectives to express the distinctions that inhere in the two English words. Part of our present problem no doubt derives from the difficulty of a translating key terms of Christianity and Gandhism from the Hebrew, Aramaic, Greek, Sanskrit, Hindi, etc. and rendering them negotiable within a common vocabulary. This difficulty is compounded by the modern tendency to debase language for the sake of a supposed efficiency at the expense of natural varieties of meaning: e.g., the tendency to use “-ize” and “-ism” against the natural bent of language, whereby we get such bastard coinages as “specialism” in place of the more natural “specialty” etc. In German the distinction between “un” and “non” is expressed by the prefix “un” and affix “-los”, offering possible distinctions of “Ungewaltigkeit” and “Gewaltlosigkeit”—neither of which would be precisely translatable as “nonviolence” or “ahimsa” but which would already possess ornate differences of meaning that would lend themselves to connotative as well as denotative use. The same problem has to be worked out within the confines of each language.


3. This is not to deny the considerable contributory benefits and side-effects of the struggle, which created a new morale, developed courage and actively promoted community feeling among the Negroes of Montgomery, and also set in motion a series of
events that were to have wide effects in a decisive and positive way throughout the South. But the fact remains that, in achieving its immediate objective, the bus boycott neither succeeded nor failed. The significance of this irony has so far been overshadowed by subsequent events, and it is doubtful whether it will prove to have any historical significance.

04. NONVIOLENCE AS A POSITIVE CONCEPT
James E. Bristol

The believer in nonviolence shares with many others the goal of a decent, just and equitable society. He wants to see an end to injustice, tyranny, corruption, and the exploitation of men by their fellows. With others he is deeply concerned to establish peace in the world, but not a peace purchased at any price. He knows that the only peace that can endure and be worthy of the name is based on justice.

Among those who think of themselves as believers in nonviolence there are diverse points of view. Some use nonviolence only as a technique which might be discarded under other circumstances; some hold to nonviolence as a matter of principle, and for some it is an essential part of their religious faith. The only honest statement to make today is that I speak for myself, and out of my own convictions, and that while there are a goodly number whose thinking I reflect, there are certainly many others who would not be in agreement with the emphasis that I will express. Although by no means all who attempt to practise nonviolence are pacifists, a number are. Since I take the pacifist position myself, it may be less clumsy to use that term than to speak constantly about “the believer in nonviolence”.

At his best the pacifist is not content with the status quo, even though for him the lines may have fallen into pleasant places. He is sensitive to the poverty, the distress, and the abject misery in which millions of his fellowmen live, not only in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, but even in his own country, and in the very city in which he dwells. He realizes that, although overt violence comes vividly to the fore when desperate people take a situation into their own hands and blood runs in the streets, violence is in fact the daily lot of a staggering number of people. When in India some mothers throw their baby children down the village well because this is the most merciful action they can take in the blind alley of poverty in which they dwell, when in the United States thousands awake every morning to contemplate
the indignities and insults to which they may be subjected that day, violence exists in all too real a fashion. Being deeply conscious of man’s ever-present inhumanity to his fellow man, the pacifist in the company of many others is impatient for change; he is a revolutionary and a fighter, a builder and a constructive worker. He is determined not merely to do away with swords and spears, but to beat the “swords into plowshares”, and the “spears into pruning hooks”.

All over the world most people think that only two reactions are possible in the face of tyranny, aggression or injustice. Men and women can either use violent methods, can kill, torture, or engage in sabotage, or they can be cowardly and surrender. When it is suggested that without recourse to violence strong and forthright resistance may be offered, many people simply fail to see this as a third alternative. Instead they equate it with the second, still thinking of nonviolent resistance as the equivalent of surrender. I accompanied Dr and Mrs. Martin Luther King during their tour of India in early 1959, and I vividly remember that a group of African students in Bombay to whom Dr King spoke about nonviolence argued that they would not surrender to the colonial powers, but would insist on winning their freedom. This is all the more noteworthy because Dr King was being hailed throughout India as the champion of freedom for people of color all over the world. Yet even when he advocated nonviolence it was misunderstood to mean acquiescence in colonial subjugation.

The pacifist, however, strives to be closer in spirit to the soldier than to the coward, and sees far more of courage than of cowardice in the lives of such practitioners of nonviolence as Gandhi, Vinoba Bhave, Martin Luther King, Abbe Pierre and Danilo Dolci.

Such men reject violence because of a deeply held conviction that the employment of violence leads men and nations away from the decent society which is their goal. Wars fought to end war, though calling forth tremendous courage and immeasurable sacrifice, have led to more rather than to less war, nor have they made the world safe for freedom and democracy.

Even preparations for war tend to produce the same tragic results. The resources, energies, initiative and imagination needed to wage successfully the war on want, poverty and human misery are instead diverted to preparing ever more fantastic weapons of violence. Nor is this all; suspicion and distrust, hostility and fear grow apace, and the security that we so vainly seek to achieve by force of arms keeps
constantly eluding us. Some fifteen years ago I heard it said that “as our military strength approaches infinity, our security approaches zero”. True though that was in 1948, it is tragically much more so today. Despite the deep sincerity of our desires, it is simply impossible to move in two opposite directions at the same time. Short of the waging of war, preparedness leads us away from the creative handling of concrete problems that must be solved and from the achievement of trust and confidence that must be realized if we are to move in the direction of a world community and the development of a just and equitable social order for people in every part of the world.

As the pacifist reads history and learns that even highly-motivated revolutions have more than once eventuated in bloody tyrannies, he is driven to the conviction that there is an inexorable relationship between the methods used to achieve our goal and the goal itself when finally reached. He is driven to believe that the end is in fact the sum total of the means we use to reach it. The “law of the harvest” is not just a quaint phrase to be found in holy writ. We reap what we sow, and only what we sow and, for all our lofty desires and avowals of idealism, thorn bushes refuse to produce grapes, and thistles figs.

Nor is this all. Not only do violent methods betray us in our effort to reach a constructive goal, but in addition in a subtle and usually unrecognized fashion their user is transformed into the image and likeness of the very evil he was opposing. While outwardly he appears to be untouched and unchanged, his behaviour has actually become so brutalized that he has become the practitioner of the very callousness and brutality from which he was determined to rescue mankind. Admittedly the pacifist says No to violence, but only in order to say Yes to the building of a just and humane society.

Gandhi’s emphasis was both on opposing the British Raj and on building a society that would make India worthy of her freedom. He led the famous “Salt March to the Sea” to make salt in defiance of the British tax laws and spent countless months in British jails, and at the same time he worked to end the caste system; he transformed the despised outcastes into “Harijans” (the children of God); he instituted the hand-spinning of thread and the hand-weaving of Khadi cloth; he improved sanitation, and he established an entirely new concept of “basic education” to meet the needs of Indian villagers.
Young Americans sit, or stand, or kneel in restaurants, stores, parks and churches in efforts to change the segregated policies practiced there. Integrated groups board buses and enter terminals on “Freedom Rides” that challenge segregation. A small group of young people leave San Francisco in December 1960, determined to “walk” all the way to Moscow. Some of them indeed do walk the entire distance from San Francisco to New York, and from the Belgian coast to Moscow. The unilateral abandonment of the weapons of mass destruction and reliance upon nonviolence and friendliness instead are both urged in this country and “told to the Russians”. Others man (in all) four boats and attempt to sail them into the forbidden nuclear testing zone in the Pacific, genuinely willing to lay down their own lives as a protest against the death-dealing and war-breeding practices of their government. At times in all these efforts civil disobedience to unjust and discriminatory laws and regulations is called for, even when this action leads to arrest and time in jail.

Such an approach when carried out in the best spirit of nonviolence has four important characteristics: (1) Participants fight tyranny, aggression, an evil system with all the vigour at their command, but they believe in the worth and dignity of their opponent and insist upon loving him even when he showers abuse or inflicts physical punishment upon them, yes, even when he kills them. (2) Participants try to bring about a change of attitude within their enemy; they strive to raise his sights, not to subdue, cripple, or kill him. (3) They take loss and suffering upon themselves. They do not inflict pain upon another, nor threaten him with pain. There is no warning of retaliation, massive or otherwise. It is important to bear in mind that nonviolent action does not mean the absence of violence, nor the absence of anguish and suffering, but that the agony involved is taken upon one’s self and not visited upon an opponent. (4) Constructive work is undertaken wherever possible. Protest against injustice, against destructive systems and practices are not enough. The eradication of poverty, the building of cooperatives, the establishment of village industry, the improvement of educational facilities, these and similar efforts must be constantly entered into.

As with the use of violence, so the practice of nonviolence is fraught with risks and hazards. People the world over are conditioned to feel that violent methods guarantee protection whereas confidence in nonviolence is but a snare and a delusion. To the pacifist both ways appear to be risky; certainly he feels no God-given guarantee of success as he embarks upon a nonviolent course of action, but he
would far rather run the risks of that approach because he believes that in so doing he is using methods which are in harmony with the under-girding purposes of the universe. The law of the harvest does operate, and since he is concerned for the welfare of his children and of his grand-children no less than for that of his contemporaries, he feels far more secure in gambling upon a nonviolent approach to the building of a just social order.

This may be hard to believe in a world where, except for the nonviolent efforts to end racial segregation in the South, there is very little to encourage the pacifist. In Africa a few years ago there was considerable interest in nonviolence among the leadership in the freedom movements; today it has almost disappeared. In South Africa several nonviolent efforts had achieved encouraging results, but the stern measures of the government have now convinced the African in that country that only violence will be effective. Even in India many staunch practitioners of nonviolence, who under Gandhi were heroic in their opposition to the British, have turned their backs upon a nonviolent approach as they face the twin enemies of China and Pakistan. I spent the last three weeks of 1962 in India and was privileged to engage in searching conversations with leaders of India, both within and without the government, men and women who had been close to Gandhi and had been deeply influenced by him. Although judgments differ, and not everyone supports the present Indian military build-up, it is unmistakably clear that we cannot look to India, as perhaps erroneously some of us did in the past, for our salvation. If we are to find a nonviolent solution to our most pressing and dangerous problems, we will have to find it for ourselves, which is probably exactly as it should be.

All over the world human beings appear to operate in their relationships with others, especially with other groups and nations, on three basic assumptions: (1) that the other person or nation is at fault; (2) that those at fault are moreover beyond the pale, at least for the time being not reacting and responding quite as other humans do; (3) that because the first two assumptions add up to the presence of an implacable enemy, we are therefore forced to abandon our moral and ethical insights, and go to any lengths, no matter how brutalized we may become in the process, in order to cope with this implacable opponent. We enter into a contest in which there are no rules or regulations, no holds, nor any excesses barred.

A nonviolent philosophy challenges these three assumptions fundamentally, believing: (1) that although others are by no means perfect, a part of the fault lies
always within ourselves, and it is here and only here that we can hope to eliminate it; (2) that although we do recognize the brutality and barbarism of the actions of our enemy, no person nor collection of persons is ever beyond the pale, else they would have had to leave the human family which they cannot do; (3) that therefore there is no greater folly than to put aside our highest insights and enter into an open-ended commitment to be as brutal and as vicious as the enemy. Our means must be consistent with our ends. In point of fact, there is no way to peace; peace is the way, and it is only as we explore it, practise it, try to incarnate it, and if necessary lay down our lives for that way, that we shall some day reach the peace that all men seek.

It is folly to say that we cannot trust the Communists, that they are just plain no good, and that our only hope lies in threatening them to the point where they become prudent. Physical and material force is not the only power in this world. There is a power to friendliness and understanding, to practiced brotherhood, to open confidence in others, to earnest efforts to remove exploitation and establish justice for our fellowmen. If there is one tragic fact that I have learned as I have moved about the world in recent years, it is that words have lost their meaning. For millions of people in Asia and Africa, in Latin America and in our own United States, the white man’s love means, in practice, hate. His justice is exploitation; his freedom is tyranny, and his peace is always in reality war.

Nothing less then is required than that words become flesh and dwell among us, for only thus will men believe and trust, and hope again. To restore faith, to unloose what was once described by the word love, to enable the moral and spiritual forces of the universe to work through us, this is far and above the most important thing for any of us to do today. To break with violence, suspicion, and hatred in a world gone mad with these passions, to show in our lives, in our No as well as in our Yes that we trust and commit all that is most precious to us to those same moral and spiritual forces—nothing else is as important and necessary for us to do today. Were we to do so in sufficient numbers there might be established a rock upon which politicians and statesmen could build for the elimination of war and the realization of peace.

Two incidents, one from India’s agony of the Hindu-Muslim riots of 1948 and the other from the current struggle in the United States for civil rights, pose a problem for nonviolence which has wide implications. The first concerns a Gandhian cadre
who died bravely at the hands of rioters. It matters little whether he was a Hindu or a Muslim; he was one and his assailants were the other; he endured their death-dealing blows without any gesture of retaliation. The episode is one of several that were reported, and the point made in each case was the bravery and steadfastness of the satyagrahi. The point I wish to raise here, however, is that in the incident to which I refer there was clearly a total absence of rapport between the satyagrahi and his attackers. Apparently, indeed, an important source of this man’s spiritual strength, enabling him to die unflinchingly, was a sense of his own purity, his very pride in being a nonviolent man. So focused were his thoughts on the rules of conduct that he was unable to affirm the bond of essential human unity with his assailants. His bravery was armoured with contempt which further inflamed rather than quenching his opponents’ hostile feelings. In short, his conduct was moralistic rather than moral; he had fulfilled the letter of the rules but had neglected their spirit and intent.

The second incident was reported to me by a Negro civil-rights activist who was leading a nonviolent demonstration, when an undisciplined Negro mob began to form. White bystanders and police were also present, and a riot was clearly in the making. The police obviously did not know how to prevent violence, though in this case they wanted to. It quickly became evident to the nonviolent Negro leader that he must address the unruly masses, but he could not make himself heard above the tumult. Following the standard rules of nonviolent conduct - as outlined in Diwakar’s Satyagraha, in my own recent Nonviolence and elsewhere - he approached the police captain who had an electrically amplified megaphone “bullhorn”, explained that he was the leader of the demonstrators and asked politely for the use of the bullhorn. The officer ignored him - how did he know if he was really the leader, or whether a police captain should delegate his authority in this way? The Negro leader became angry, shouted at the captain: “You’d better give me that bullhorn, you stupid, or there’s going to be hell to pay”- and seizing the bullhorn from the startled officer’s hand began addressing the crowd, which soon quietened and dispersed.

Conscious of his breach of the accepted rules in venting his anger, the Negro leader asked my opinion as a theorist, and we discussed the episode and its meaning at some length. The nub of it came to this, that he had been in other situations in which he knew that such an angry outburst would bring a hostile response - arrest,
clubbing, perhaps shooting and he was capable of curbing the impulse. But in the situation described above, he sensed rightly that such behaviour would enable him to take charge and calm the mob. There was a risk; he took it and was vindicated by the result. His anger was not motivated by hatred but by the desire to get through to the mob. Afterwards he had thereby won the respect of the police captain, who was so relieved by the speedy solution that he tacitly forgave and forgot the insult. This is not an episode that I would want to offer anyone as a model; it presupposes a great deal of both insight and nerve as well as the seasoning of experience. Yet one cannot rebuke the leader. The shock of anger was undeniably effective, and certainly the leader would have been remiss if he had stuck to politeness while tension mounted and burst into violence. In its way, his was very much an “experiment with truth”, albeit both riskier and more fruitful than the moralistic rote application of the rules which Gandhi distilled from his own experiments. Moreover, it illustrates something that is fundamental to experimentation. There is a sense in which experiments serve merely to test and validate a hypothesis or to confirm by demonstration the process or mechanics by which it works. How many hours must a psychology student spend in replicating today the classic experiments of Pavlov, Hull, Terman and Skinner. In this sense, every cadre learns his basic nonviolence by replicating the classic patterns of Satyagraha on the model of Gandhi, Patel, Luthuli, King and others.

But there is also a point at which the advancement of knowledge requires the assertion of new, previously untested hypotheses or the re-exploration of those discarded by earlier pioneers. Perhaps there are new factors that were not formerly taken into account; perhaps the conditions under which a formerly unsuccessful venture was tried were unusual in some way. So the graduate student of psychology is drawn into a further dimension of inquiry - as must be the seasoned nonviolent cadre.

Floyd Dell, associate editor of the radical American magazine The Masses, wrote prophetically in 1916: “The theory of non-resistance is the pre-scientific phase of a new kind of knowledge, the knowledge - to put it vaguely - of relationships. Here is a field as yet unexplored save by the seers and the poets. Its laws are as capable of being discovered as those of astronomy or botany; and the practical application of this knowledge is capable of effecting far greater social changes than the invention
of the steam engine. At present, however, we have only rhapsodies and maxims, the biography of an Oriental god - and a few contemporary anecdotes.”

In the half-century since then, we have moved a long way from alchemy and wizardry toward chemistry and science. The word “nonviolence” did not even exist, and it would be decades before it even began to enter the intellectual vocabulary. The whole history of the great Indian Swaraj movement under Gandhi had not even begun when Dell wrote.

During that half-century occurred not only this and other historic events, but the first serious attempts at theory and interpretation and of research above the level of the edifying anecdote, bringing to light earlier historic episodes. The studies of Case, Ligt, Huxley, Gregg, Bondurant, Sharp, Galtung, Kuper, Naess and other in the West, of Gandhi; Diwakar, N. K. Bose, Shridharani, Bhave, Narayan and others in India - not always of the best quality, sometimes lapsing into idle fantasy, but in general building and growing - all of these have indeed lifted nonviolence from the pre-scientific phase and launched it as a matter worthy of the attention of the scientific mind. It can no longer be smirked at as the preoccupation of sentimentalists, fanatics or saints. As these lines are written, two hundred unarmed sailors of the U.S. Navy - are on their way to Mississippi under orders from the President of the United States to act in the incredibly tense racial situation there. There is no telling, at this moment, what will happen next. But this much is obvious: such an action would not have been undertaken but for the examples arising from the past half-century of the maturation of nonviolence.

It is fitting; too, that Dell referred to “the knowledge of relationships”, for this half-century has witnessed a parallel maturation in psychology and sociology which very recently have become closely interrelated with nonviolence. Corman, Choisy, Frankle, Bettelheim, Frank, Boulding, Lakey, Sibley are among those whose contributions have been most noteworthy, and it is precisely in this dimension that a large degree of further exploration needs to be done.

To be sure, there is a considerable field for historical research. According to Crane Brinton, a serious study of country chronicles in England could provide documentation for a historic tradition of unarmed peasant revolts and civil disobedience going back to medieval times. This is only one of many neglected and unexplored territories; another is the general history of religious non-resistance in the West, tracing its various forms and doctrinal contexts. It would be interesting to
learn more, for instance, about the relationship of mysticism and humanism, orthodoxy and various heresies to nonviolence.

But even if this kind of information is brought to light, it remains to be interpreted and understood in terms of motivation and dynamics. So many of our ethical norms and valuations are rationalistic or traditional. Consider, for example, Gandhi’s life long struggle within the tensions between reason and custom as he came to terms with the problem of varna. The step from untouchability to the designation of Harijan was a considerable one for a man and for a society, easier to grasp from outside the event or after it, yet the persistence of the problem and of others like it. Such as race and class bias, attests to the inadequacy of our present resources to fulfill the mandate. We must at least question all the pat answers - it’s just a question of bread, of education, of religious training, etc. - and acknowledge that much of what we do is done in ignorance of how or why or even to whom.

Except in the rarest cases, it is not a question of suspending or abandoning action because we don’t know what we are doing. One of the prime lessons of Satyagraha is the necessity of purposive action, whether to affirm or to resist or to construct. Fatalistic acquiescence is no kind of option. But as we act and commit ourselves, and as we observe the responses of others, we also need to strive towards a better understanding of the inner motives, latent possibilities, probable consequences. The chief task of the last fifty years has been to get our facts straight, to sort out the socio-historical from the merely anecdotal, to codify and classify the insights and precepts of the sages and pioneers. Other generations will have to repeat these tasks with variations, but the ground work has been done. A readier example would be hard to find than Diwakar’s concise, tightly organized Satyagraha, which spares the reader the necessity of wandering endlessly through volumes of Gandhi’s journalistic writings. It does not render the latter useless but provides the student with a structure or a compass. And, in turn, it makes possible the more expanded yet similarly structured study represented by Bondurant’s Conquest of Violence. Each builds on the others, and the total result is extremely valuable. But of necessity it remains far from complete and some of the literature may even be misleading. As a case in point, Gregg’s The Power of Nonviolence was the first book in the field which seriously attempted to provide a psychological foundation.

Gregg’s concept of “moral jiu-jitsu” still is largely cogent, yet in some respects it has been superseded by Maryse Choisy’s post-Freudian conception of the same basic
process, and many relatively minor aspects of Gregg’s psychology have come to seem makeshift and obsolete in the thirty years since his book was first published. He is not in bad company; a good deal of Marx and Freud looks rather curious and quaint in retrospect, and we must remember that their wiser successors’ wisdom is rooted in their heritage.

I think it is worth noting that sixteen years of development separates the two episodes mentioned at the beginning of this essay. The Negro leader had learned much that was not available to the Gandhian cadre, and indeed he had the opportunity of thinking at leisure and in broad perspective about the very situation in which the latter had to decide and act. But above all, the Negro leader knew that both he and the theoretical equipment of the movement had matured to the point at which new experimentation takes over from the preliminary replications.

Progress is not automatic, and new departures do not necessarily go forward or upward. I am making no sweeping claims here, only indicating a change which at least seems to reflect a growing concern with the content of the interpersonal encounter rather than a self-sufficient moral posture. The two men could have been both acting in 1918 or both in 1964 - or in Vedic or Biblical times. But there is reason to think that their individual outlooks are symptomatic of a more widespread change. For at the same time, during the past decade or so, that important strides have been made in the study of nonviolence and in the development of existential psychology and other relevant interpretative disciplines, the worldwide nonviolent movement has been undergoing historic crises - the rise and collapse of the Committee of One Hundred in England, the defeat of the African National Congress in South Africa and the desperate turn represented by Poqo and Umkonte We Sizwe there, the impact of the China India border clash on India’s Gandhians, the turn towards fascism in Ghana, the rising voice of black particularism within the Negro community in the United States, the virtual abandonment of nonviolence by the newly emergent African republics, the apparently meteoric rise and fall of voluntaristic international Shanti Sena plans. Michael Scott, writing in a recent issue of Twentieth Century, voices the new mood as he assesses the failure of the Committee of One Hundred, which he helped to found. The mood is not one of renegacy or even of slackened commitment, but it is disillusioned in the sense that the high optimism of revolutionary romanticism has yielded to a self-critical realism. The time is past for making extravagant claims for “the method” and its
efficacy. As recently as a decade ago, it was possible to think primarily of “defending” or “arguing for” the idea of nonviolence, and facts were regarded as bulwarks of evidence; whatever did not help to promote the idea tended to be shunted aside or rationalized away. There has scarcely ever been an idea under the sun that did not undergo this sort of infancy. Universal manhood suffrage, the Western working-class movement, and the rights of women - each in turn has begun by proposing itself as virtually the definitive answer, the key to the good life and the Kingdom of God. And each has reached a point of equilibrium at which modesty and candour brought disillusionment and a new perspective - never, to be sure, without the danger of apostasy, when some of the most ardent devotees make a sharp about-face to repudiate “the God that failed”.

There are such apostates of nonviolence today, but it is worth noting that most of them were never leaders, however intensely their emotions were committed to the cause; they have experienced an intellectual sense of betrayal, pivoted to a volatile temperament - not an existential volte-face. Michael Scott, speaking from the centre of existential commitment, thus articulates not only the crisis but also the under girding equilibrium to which non-violence has come. Paradoxically it is a crisis of success as well as of failure. To revert to an earlier analogy, it is possible to discuss the “crisis in physics” or the dilemma of the “two cultures” as posed by C. P. Snow without raising fundamental doubts about science as such. Nonviolence has reached such a point, and Scott and others, confident that nonviolence has proved itself feasible in history, are now putting aside yesterday’s propagandistic zeal and are raising key questions about discipline, organization, tactics, the problem of freedom and order within the movement and Between it and the normative society. There seems to be a growing consensus that non-violence requires certain minimally favourable conditions. Scott, for example, sees a need for a strong impartial international power capable of augmenting the nonviolent movements for justice within or between armed states which have shown how onerous and implacable they can be. To say this is to recognize that nonviolence does not work miracles by itself. Martin Luther King does not hesitate to call upon governmental authorities to use force to restore order when nonviolent Negroes are mobbed by violent whites. This is a tacit admission of the limits of human endurance in the given situation; it is not possible to ask men to suffer perpetually or to seek victory only through sainthood.
But we would concede too much if we said only that nonviolence is coming down to earth and adjusting to irrefragable human nature, for we do not yet know too much about human nature. I do not mean the perennial moral debate about its intrinsic goodness, sinfulness, transience or evil, but rather its inner complexities. This is what distinguishes the two cadres mentioned earlier - the one predicated on a rigid moralism, the other on a risky process of interaction. We need to know far more than we do at present about the workings of human relationships. Why did the police captain respond as he did? How much of the dynamic was in his specific personality and character structure? How far can Gandhi’s classic concept of a “soul force” generated from within explain this episode? Must we try to adapt the “soul force” concept to the situation, or does this case perhaps call for an alternative hypothesis? In science there are, for example, molecular and wave theories of light. Each is useful; neither pretends to be a final, exclusive statement of absolute truth.

It is hard to say whether Floyd Dell or Gandhi or others of the earlier period would recognize or welcome the present phase of thinking and experimentation as compatible with their legacy, for in many ways the terms in which they understood the meaning of science were different from those that apply today. The beginning of wisdom, said Socrates, is the confession of our present ignorance. If a single sentence could sum up the great legacy of Gandhi and his colleagues, I think it would be this: they led us out of the darkness of conventional wisdom and showed us the falsity of the generally accepted belief in the supremacy of violence. Dazzled by the brilliance of this great deed, we were tempted to see it as magical - as children are prone to do. Now we see where we are, at the foot of the path of enlightenment, scarcely knowing how far it may lead us, but aware that we have a long way to go.
05. EXPERIMENTATION IN NONVIOLENCE: THE NEXT PHASE
William Robert Miller

Two incidents, one from India’s agony of the Hindu-Muslim riots of 1948 and the other from the current struggle in the United States for civil rights, pose a problem for nonviolence which has wide implications. The first concerns a Gandhian cadre who died bravely at the hands of rioters. It matters little whether he was a Hindu or a Muslim; he was one and his assailants were the other; he endured their death-dealing blows without any gesture of retaliation. The episode is one of several that were reported, and the point made in each case was the bravery and steadfastness of the Satyagrahi. The point I wish to raise here, however, is that in the incident to which I refer there was clearly a total absence of rapport between the Satyagrahi and his attackers. Apparently, indeed, an important source of this man’s spiritual strength, enabling him to die unflinchingly, was a sense of his own purity, his very pride in being a nonviolent man. So focused were his thoughts on the rules of conduct that he was unable to affirm the bond of essential human unity with his assailants. His bravery was armoured with contempt which further inflamed rather than quenching his opponents’ hostile feelings. In short, his conduct was moralistic rather than moral; he had fulfilled the letter of the rules but had neglected their spirit and intent.

The second incident was reported to me by a Negro civil-rights activist who was leading a nonviolent demonstration, when an undisciplined Negro mob began to form. White bystanders and police were also present, and a riot was clearly in the making. The police obviously did not know how to prevent violence, though in this case they wanted to. It quickly became evident to the nonviolent Negro leader that he must address the unruly masses, but he could not make himself heard above the tumult. Following the standard rules of nonviolent conduct—as outlined in Diwakar’s Satyagraha, in my own recent Nonviolence and elsewhere—he approached the police captain who had an electrically amplified megaphone “bullhorn”, explained that he was the leader of the demonstrators and asked politely for the use of the bullhorn. The officer ignored him—how did he know if he was really the leader, or whether a police captain should delegate his authority in this way? The Negro leader became angry, shouted at the captain: “You’d better give me that bullhorn, you stupid—, or there’s going to be hell to pay”—and seizing
the bullhorn from the startled officer’s hand began addressing the crowd, which soon quietened and dispersed.

Conscious of his breach of the accepted rules in venting his anger, the Negro leader asked my opinion as a theorist, and we discussed the episode and its meaning at some length. The nub of it came to this, that he had been in other situations in which he knew that such an angry outburst would bring a hostile response—arrest, clubbing, perhaps shooting—and he was capable of curbing the impulse. But in the situation described above, he sensed rightly that such behaviour would enable him to take charge and calm the mob. There was a risk; he took it and was vindicated by the result. His anger was not motivated by hatred but by the desire to get through to the mob. Afterwards he had thereby won the respect of the police captain, who was so relieved by the speedy solution that he tacitly forgave and forgot the insult.

This is not an episode that I would want to offer anyone as a model; it presupposes a great deal of both insight and nerve as well as the seasoning of experience. Yet one cannot rebuke the leader. The shock of anger was undeniably effective, and certainly the leader would have been remiss if he had stuck to politeness while tension mounted and burst into violence. In its way, his was very much an “experiment with truth”, albeit both riskier and more fruitful than the moralistic rote application of the rules which Gandhi distilled from his own experiments.

Moreover, it illustrates something that is fundamental to experimentation. There is a sense in which experiments serve merely to test and validate a hypothesis or to confirm by demonstration the process or mechanics by which it works. How many hours must a psychology student spend in replicating today the classic experiments of Pavlov, Hull, Terman and Skinner. In this sense, every cadre learns his basic nonviolence by replicating the classic patterns of Satyagraha on the model of Gandhi, Patel, Luthuli, King and others.

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Conquest of Violence. Each builds on the others, and the total result is extremely valuable. But of necessity it remains far from complete and some of the literature may even be misleading. As a case in point, Gregg’s The Power of Nonviolence was the first book in the field which seriously attempted to provide a psychological foundation. Gregg’s concept of “moral jiu-jitsu” still is largely cogent, yet in some respects it has been superseded by Maryse Choisy’s post-Freudian conception of the same basic process, and many relatively minor aspects of Gregg’s psychology have come to seem makeshift and obsolete in the thirty years since his book was first published. He is not in bad company; a good deal of Marx and Freud looks rather curious and quaint in retrospect, and we must remember that their wiser successors’ wisdom is rooted in their heritage.

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Progress is not automatic, and new departures do not necessarily go forward or upward. I am making no sweeping claims here, only indicating a change which at least seems to reflect a growing concern with the content of the interpersonal encounter rather than a self-sufficient moral posture. The two men could have been both acting in 1948 or both in 1964—or in Vedic or Biblical times. But there is reason to think that their individual outlooks are symptomatic of a more widespread change. For at the same time, during the past decade or so, that important strides have been made in the study of nonviolence and in the development of existential psychology and other relevant interpretative disciplines, the worldwide nonviolent movement has been undergoing historic crises—the rise and collapse of the Committee of One Hundred in England, the defeat of the African National Congress in South Africa and the desperate turn represented by Poqo and Umkonte We Sizwe there, the impact of the China-India border clash on India’s Gandhians, the turn towards fascism in Ghana, the rising voice of black particularism within the Negro community in the United States, the virtual abandonment of nonviolence by the newly emergent African republics, the
apparently meteoric rise and fall of voluntaristic international Shanti Sena plans. Michael Scott, writing in a recent issue of *Twentieth Century*, voices the new mood as he assesses the failure of the Committee of One Hundred, which he helped to found. The mood is not one of renegacy or even of slackened commitment, but it is disillusioned in the sense that the high optimism of revolutionary romanticism has yielded to a self-critical realism. The time is past for making extravagant claims for “the method” and its efficacy. As recently as a decade ago, it was possible to think primarily of “defending” or “arguing for” the idea of nonviolence, and facts were regarded as bulwarks of evidence; whatever did not help to promote the idea tended to be shunted aside or rationalized away. There has scarcely ever been an idea under the sun that did not undergo this sort of infancy. Universal manhood suffrage, the Western working-class movement, the rights of women—each in turn has begun by proposing itself as virtually the definitive answer, the key to the good life and the Kingdom of God. And each has reached a point of equilibrium at which modesty and candour brought disillusionment and a new perspective—never, to be sure, without the danger of apostasy, when some of the most ardent devotees make a sharp about-face to repudiate “the God that failed”.

There are such apostates of nonviolence today, but it is worth noting that most of them were never leaders, however intensely their emotions were committed to the cause; they have experienced an intellectual sense of betrayal, pivoted to a volatile temperament—not an existential *volte-face*. Michael Scott, speaking from the centre of existential commitment, thus articulates not only the crisis but also the undergirding equilibrium to which nonviolence has come. Paradoxically it is a crisis of success as well as of failure. To revert to an earlier analogy, it is possible to discuss the “crisis in physics” or the dilemma of the “two cultures” as posed by C.P. Snow without raising fundamental doubts about science as such. Nonviolence has reached such a point, and Scott and others, confident that nonviolence has proved itself feasible in history, are now putting aside yesterday’s propagandistic zeal and are raising key questions about discipline, organization, tactics, the problem of freedom and order within the movement and between it and the normative society. There seems to be a growing consensus that nonviolence requires certain minimally favourable conditions. Scott, for example, sees a need for a strong impartial international power capable of augmenting the nonviolent
movements for justice within or between armed states which have shown how onerous and implacable they can be. To say this is to recognize that nonviolence does not work miracles by itself. Martin Luther King does not hesitate to call upon governmental authorities to use force to restore order when nonviolent Negroes are mobbed by violent whites. This is a tacit admission of the limits of human endurance in the given situation; it is not possible to ask men to suffer perpetually or to seek victory only through sainthood.

But we would concede too much if we said only that nonviolence is coming down to earth and adjusting to irrefragable human nature, for we do not yet know too much about human nature. I do not mean the perennial moral debate about its intrinsic goodness, sinfulness, transiency or evil, but rather its inner complexities. This is what distinguishes the two cadres mentioned earlier—the one predicated on a rigid moralism, the other on a risky process of interaction. We need to know far more than we do at present about the workings of human relationships. Why did the police captain respond as he did? How much of the dynamic was in his specific personality and character structure? How far can Gandhi’s classic concept of a “soul force” generated from within explain this episode? Must we try to adapt the “soul force” concept to the situation, or does this case perhaps call for an alternative hypothesis? In science there are, for example, molecular and wave theories of light. Each is useful; neither pretends to be a final, exclusive statement of absolute truth.

It is hard to say whether Floyd Dell or Gandhi or others of the earlier period would recognize or welcome the present phase of thinking and experimentation as compatible with their legacy, for in many ways the terms in which they understood the meaning of science were different from those that apply today. The beginning of wisdom, said Socrates, is the confession of our present ignorance. If a single sentence could sum up the great legacy of Gandhi and his colleagues, I think it would be this: they led us out of the darkness of conventional wisdom and showed us the falsity of the generally accepted belief in the supremacy of violence. Dazzled by the brilliance of this great deed, we were tempted to see it as magical—as children are prone to do. Now we see where we are, at the foot of the path of enlightenment, scarcely knowing how far it may lead us, but aware that we have a long way to go.
05. SATYAGRAHA VERSUS DURAGRAHA: THE LIMITS OF SYMBOLIC VIOLENCE
By Joan V. Bondurant

Every leader who seeks to win a battle without violence and who presumes to precipitate a war against conventional attitudes and arrangements—however prejudiced they may be—would do well to probe the subtleties which distinguish Satyagraha from other forms of action without overt violence. There are essential elements in Gandhian Satyagraha which do not readily meet the eye. The readiness with which Gandhi’s name is invoked and the self-satisfaction with which leaders of movements throughout the world make reference to Gandhian methods are not always backed by an understanding of either the subtleties or the basic principles of Satyagraha. It is important to pose a question and to state a challenge to those who believe that they know how a Gandhian movement is to be conducted. For nonviolence alone is weak, non-cooperation in itself could lead to defeat, and civil disobedience without creative action may end in alienation. How, then, does Satyagraha differ from other approaches? This question can be explored by contrasting Satyagraha with concepts of passive resistance defined by the Indian word, duragraha.

Duragraha means prejudice. Perhaps better than any other single word, it connotes the attributes of passive resistance. Duragraha may be said to be stubborn resistance in a cause, or willfulness. The distinctions between duragraha and Satyagraha as these words are used to designate concepts of direct social action are to be found in each of the major facets of such action.¹ Let us examine (1) the character of the objective for which the action is undertaken, (2) the process through which the objective is expected to be secured, and (3) the styles which characterize the respective approaches. Satyagraha and duragraha are compared below in each of these three aspects by considering their relative treatment of first, pressure and persuasion, and second, guilt and responsibility. Finally, we shall have a look at the meaning and limitations of symbolic violence.

I. PRESSURE AND PERSUASION
If non-cooperation, civil disobedience, fasting, and nonviolent strike represent only partial—but never essential—expressions of satyagraha in action, this is because the Gandhian method goes well beyond the more simple and direct use of pressure. The objective of satyagraha is the constructive transforming of relationships in a manner which not only effects a change of policy but also assures
To be sure, there is a considerable field for historical research. According to Crane Brinton, a serious study of country chronicles in England could provide documentation for a historic tradition of unarmed peasant revolts and civil disobedience going back to medieval times. This is only one of many neglected and unexplored territories; another is the general history of religious non-resistance in the West, tracing its various forms and doctrinal contexts. It would be interesting to learn more, for instance, about the relationship of mysticism and humanism, orthodoxy and various heresies to nonviolence.

But even if this kind of information is brought to light, it remains to be interpreted and understood in terms of motivation and dynamics. So many of our ethical norms and valuations are rationalistic or traditional. Consider, for example, Gandhi’s lifelong struggle within the tensions between reason and custom as he came to terms with the problem of varna. The step from untouchability to the designation of Harijan was a considerable one for a man and for a society, easier to grasp from outside the event or after it, yet the persistence of the problem and of others like it, such as race and class bias, attests to the inadequacy of our present resources to fulfill the mandate. We must at least question all the pat answers—it’s just a question of bread, of education, of religious training, etc.—and acknowledge that much of what we do is done in ignorance of how or why or even to whom.

Except in the rarest cases, it is not a question of suspending or abandoning action because we don’t know what we are doing. One of the prime lessons of satyagraha is the necessity of purposive action, whether to affirm or to resist or to construct. Fatalistic acquiescence is no kind of option. But as we act and commit ourselves, and as we observe the responses of others, we also need to strive towards a better understanding of the inner motives, latent possibilities, probable consequences. The chief task of the last fifty years has been to get our facts straight, to sort out the socio-historical from the merely anecdotal, to codify and classify the insights and precepts of the sages and pioneers. Other generations will have to repeat these tasks with variations, but the ground work has been done. A readier example would be hard to find than Diwakar’s concise, tightly organized Satyagraha, which spares the reader the necessity of wandering endlessly through volumes of Gandhi’s journalistic writings. It does not render the latter useless but provides the student with a structure or a compass. And, in turn, it makes possible the more expanded yet similarly structured study represented by Bondurant’s
the restructuring of the situation which led to conflict. This calls for a modification of attitudes and requires fulfillment of the significant needs of all parties originally in conflict. The fulfilling of needs is both an objective and a means for effecting fundamental change.

The immediate cause for action, both of a satyagrahic and duragrahic nature, is an allegedly unjust policy. The search for a solution to the conflict which results, once the policy and its proponents are opposed, is understood by the duragrahi in terms of applying pressure with skill and in sufficient strength to force the opponent to stand down. In satyagraha the search itself partakes of the objective, for it affords the stimulation and provides the satisfactions which attend all creative efforts. The dynamics of satyagraha are end-creating. The objective is, conceptually, only a starting point. The end cannot be predicted, and must necessarily be left open. As we shall see below, the process, as it relates ends to means, is complex.

In contrast, duragraha approaches the conflict with a set of prejudgements. The opponent is, *ipso facto*, wrong. The objective is to overcome the opponent and to destroy his position. The task the duragrahi sets himself is to demonstrate the fallacious or immoral character of the position held by the opponent, and to substitute for it a preconceived correct and morally right position. A duragraha campaign has the often satisfying advantage of being direct and simple. The objective is given, and the end conclusive.

The uses of pressure are valued by both satyagrahi and duragrahi. Pressure, as the action of a force against some opposing force, has a place in both approaches. But in satyagraha this mechanical meaning of the term describes only the initial action in a complex system of dynamics. The satyagrahi develops an interacting force (with the opponent) which produces new movement and which may change the direction or even the content of the force. The opponent is engaged in a manner which will result in the transformation of relationships into a form or pattern which could not have been predicted with any precision. The subtleties of response from the opponent are channelled back into the satyagrahi’s movement and these responding pressures are given the maximum opportunity to influence subsequent procedures, and even the content of the satyagrahi’s claims and objectives. This process has been described elsewhere as the Gandhian dialectic.²
Pressure is understood in duragraha in the sense of steady pushing or thrusting to effect weight or burden, and usually it results in distress. Pressure in the mechanical sense is not developed further into a process reflecting influences from the opposition or, to be more exact, duragraha does not develop such a process through design. The strike is typical of this straightforward application of pressure. The strike is commonly used to effect economic pressure, and is intended to hurt business, or to strain relationships so that normal functions are brought to a halt, or at least inhibited. Normal functioning cannot be resumed until policy changes are instituted.

In the field of labour relations, sophisticated forms of collective bargaining represent an advanced technique of negotiation and compromise. Relationships do indeed change, but these changes are in degree, and only to the extent that degree can become so great as to represent kind do they reflect fundamental transformation. The process of strike, or passive resistance, or duragraha in its most common forms, amounts to the intensification of pressure or the shifting of points of attack until a settlement is reached through capitulation or through compromise. The objective does not partake of a search, nor does it require an explicit intent to discover solutions which will satisfy the opponent. Duragraha seeks concessions; satyagraha sets out to develop alternatives which will satisfy antagonists on all sides. Creativity is essential in satyagraha—not only in devising techniques adapted to given instances of conflict, but also as an inherent part of the philosophy which underlies satyagraha. Satyagraha may be likened to the thought process objectified. One can draw upon Dewey’s analysis of purposive action to suggest the process in operation. Satyagraha on the field of action is reminiscent of the process of inquiry and solution of problems as described by Samuel Beer: “An enquiring mind comes to a problem with certain purposes, but in its contact with fact those purposes are modified and enriched. New traits in a situation may be perceived and that perception will modify the purposes which were brought to the situation. Thus creative solutions arise. In the continuum of inquiry, the inquirer’s perspective is continually developed. The purposes and interests which he brings to inquiry guide him in his contacts with the facts. But what he learns about the facts in turn guides the development of his interests and purposes. If he is to learn, he must start from what he already knows. In that sense his approach to the facts is limited and biased and he is ‘blind’ to many aspects of
the facts. But we must not forget that he can learn and that in the course of
learning his initial purposes may be greatly enlarged and deepened.”

Over against the harassment and distress commonly effected in duragraha is set
the fundamentally supportive nature of satyagraha. As the satyagrahi moves to
bring about change in the situation through persuading his opponent to modify or
alter the position under attack, he seeks to strengthen interpersonal relationships
and intrapersonal satisfactions through acts of support and, where appropriate,
through service to the opponent. This approach goes well beyond the nebulous and
often platitudinous insistence that all men are brothers and that love for the
opponent dominates the feeling and dictates the action. It is based upon a
psychologically sound understanding about suffering and the capacity of man to
change.

The discovery that fundamental change is accompanied by suffering can be
understood through a bit of self-introspection. The more rigid and fixed the
attitude, or the more habitual the behaviour, the more painful the process of
change. Persisting, obstinate attitudes are not without their cause. They perform a
function which has its origin in personal history and they are part of an
intrapersonal economy, any disruption of which will be experienced as distress and
even as a major personal threat. It follows from these elementary psychological
facts that change can best be effected in the context of reassurance and through
efforts to delimit the area of attack. It may, indeed, be impossible to bring about
a change in attitudes and to achieve the transformation of relationships without
extensive reassurance and support. Otherwise the conflict becomes exacerbated,
the opposition hardened, and the prospects of a life-and-death struggle enhanced.

When the dispute is over a simple policy change which does not challenge long-
standing custom or in which the emotional investment is low, then duragraha may
well succeed. The undermining of the opponent may result in sufficient distress to
bring about compromise and concession within tolerable limits of change. But
when fundamental attitudes and long-established beliefs are challenged, the
required change may be impossible to tolerate without considerable supportive
effort. When change of such fundamental nature is involved, the harassment of a
strike, demonstration, or other form of duragrahic attack will not achieve the
response or perhaps will achieve it only through overwhelming the opponent and
destroying the possibility of a sound, transformed relationship.
Some form of destruction is involved in all change. In satyagraha the more serious the expected change (and, therefore, the more radical the destruction of established patterns), the more essential it is to undertake counter and parallel constructive efforts of a high order.

The creative process of satyagraha is applied in a supportive style towards a restructured end. This integrative mode of approach does not depend upon ideal views of mankind, but, rather, it is based upon the knowledge of the psychological needs common to every man.

II. Guilt And Responsibility
Wherever nonviolent movements are undertaken in the interest of asserting or establishing human or civil or “inherent” rights, the atmosphere is ripe for the emergence of an attitude which threatens constructive solutions. Self-righteousness is an extension into the realm of personal ascription of the sounder quality of moral indignation. Self-righteousness attaches to the actions of some through a failure to examine personal motives or to appreciate its affect in the objective circumstance. But to others, self-righteousness follows upon an explicit use of the alleged, or assumed, guilt of others. For there are those who set out to disclose the guilt of others, and to use this disclosure as a technique in prosecuting their “nonviolent” attacks. The purpose of this emphasis upon guilt and the manner in which guilt disclosure is intended to function is not always clear. It may be dictated by a consideration indirectly related to the given conflict, as for example, a commitment to an ideological position not germane to the conflict at hand. Among such commitments, perhaps the best known is the doctrine of class warfare.

The author has on occasion heard participants in phases of the American civil rights movement instructed to disrupt business in retail shops for the purpose not only of putting pressure upon shop-owners to integrate their work force, but also of harassing customers so that they will recognize their own guilt. The argument is that the ordinary American housewife goes about her business in the markets with a false sense of innocence. She must be brought to understand that she, too, is guilty of discrimination. It may be that the unconcerned third party is in this way forced to recognize a fault and, in recognizing guilt, he (or she) will join or at least tacitly support the demonstrators. Such an expectation is, on its face, somewhat unrealistic, but however the expectation is to be assessed, the
procedure reveals a point of critical significance. When a group is enjoined to
disclose guilt on the part of others, while at the same time they set about
demonstrating their own guiltlessness, the mechanism suggests psychological
projection, the true meaning of which is an unconscious sense of guilt in the
demonstrators themselves. It may be guilt of prejudice against the middleclass of
which the American housewife is such an eminent representative. Or it may reflect
unconscious guilt on the part of the demonstrator against the very persons upon
whose behalf he is demonstrating. The symbolic meaning of such action is noted
below (section III) in the discussion of symbolic violence. Whatever the objective,
the interest in producing a sense of guilt through discomfiting others is destined to
exacerbate the conflict. This may indeed be its intent, and certainly it might
succeed, in uncomplicated situations where simple duragraha has some chance of
success. But where extensive and fundamental change is desired, reliance upon
this procedure will fail of any clear and constructive purpose. For guilt is a
destructive force and is closely related to fear and hatred.

The central point of criticism of the active use of guilt is not that the self-
righteous demonstrator may himself harbour guilt, but, rather, that he is evidently
unaware of his own guilt. The freely informed and acutely aware individual does
not point the finger of shame at others. He sets about his task in quite different
ways. And in recognizing his own prejudices—wherever they may lie—he engages
with his opponents, as well as with his companions, in the struggle in order to
search for constructive solutions and to transform relationships. Gandhi repeatedly
warned of the dangers involved in focusing upon the misdeeds of the opponent.
“After all”, he observed, “no one is wicked by nature….and if others are wicked,
are we the less so? That attitude is inherent in satyagraha.”

Earlier, Gandhi had written, “Whenever I see an erring man, I say to myself, I have also erred”, and
again, in opposing the use of sitting dharna, he explained: “We must refrain from
crying ‘shame, shame’ to anybody, we must not use any coercion to persuade
other people to adopt our way. We must guarantee to them the same freedom we
claim for ourselves.”

Among the most constant and abiding efforts of the satyagrahi is the extension of
areas of rationality. He recognizes the significance of the irrational, but, in
contrast to the duragrahi, the satyagrahi seeks to minimize and not to use the
irrational.
The relationship to those one seeks to change calls for a high level of responsibility. It is incumbent upon the satyagrahi actively to concern himself with the problems he is presenting to his opponent. His recognition of the burden his demands place upon his opponent is prerequisite to action. He is expecting his opponent to renounce or reject patterns of behaviour to which he has long been accustomed—and oftentimes behaviour which appears not only justified to the opponent, but which may also seem to him to accord with high moral standards. If conventional social forms are involved which carry sanctions for failure to comply (as in the law or established custom), the demonstrator, by his act of contravention, is presenting to the opponent and to third parties formally not involved in the conflict, the necessity to make a choice. This choice may well require an act of faith on the part of the opponent. For the demonstrator is stating a position contrary to hitherto accepted form and usage. He is saying, in effect, “The established conventions and authorities are wrong; what I am doing is right; accept my way”. In acting upon this assertion, the demonstrator is calling for the opponent to have faith in the demonstrator’s judgement. A well launched demonstration is calculated to confront the opponent in such a manner that he is forced to make a choice. Opponents and otherwise uninvolved onlookers are faced with the need to examine their own behaviour. Conduct which was formerly taken for granted is in this way questioned. If the opponent and the onlooker persist in the old way, the behaviour which was formerly habitual and automatic now is consciously taken, and for that very reason it is likely to gain the strength of conviction.

The responsibility for forcing a choice requires to be seriously weighed. Questions should be raised about one’s justification in asking the opponent to trust this judgement which is alien and unwelcome. When responsibility of this order is carefully studied, the need for supportive activity to the opponent can be more clearly understood. The details of support and the manner in which it may be undertaken can best emerge in the course of examining the extent of this responsibility within the context of a given conflict situation. When conscious decision is forced upon others, it becomes all the more important that guilt be dispelled, fear abated, and passions controlled. The forcing of new choices is a tactic for effecting change in a static situation. At the critical juncture when choice is forced, the satyagrahi must shoulder his greatest burdens. He will be
confronted by persons seized with doubts and uncertainties and it is his obligation to tolerate their abuse, should it be offered, and to find ways in which to strengthen and reassure his opponents. His own strength at such junctures is put to the greatest test, and his own capacity for creative thought and imaginative act is taxed to the fullest.

As the satyagrahi engages his opponent in constructive conflict, his responsibility is to be understood also in terms of responsiveness. The open-ended nature of his objectives and the transforming function of the process require that he extend to his opponent not only the respect implied by humanistic values, but also a measure of trust which goes well beyond that tolerated by proponents of duragraha. It is of the essence of satyagraha that every response from the opponent be accepted as genuine and that all undertakings of the opponent be considered to have been given in good faith. In satyagraha this is not only a matter of strategy, based upon an active search for truth, but it is also an effective tactic. If the opponent gives any indication of changing his position and altering his behaviour—in either direction—this indication must be given full recognition. It is essential to accept as genuine threats of violence or acts of hostility as well as any expression of intent on the part of the opponent to move towards a resolution of the conflict. To demonstrate acceptance and belief in the opponent’s good faith will serve to hold the opponent to his word, to diminish his hesitation, and to encourage the realization of his perhaps shaky intent. It is a basic principle of satyagraha to consider as genuine all counter-suggestions.

The proponent of duragraha is characteristically conditioned to doubt every move made by his opponent, and to suppose that his opponent is acting in bad faith. The opponent must be actively opposed, his every act suspected. This readiness to doubt the good faith of an opponent may be put forward as a piece of sophistication, based upon experience or knowledge of human nature. In operation such an approach is poor strategy and worse tactics. The satyagrahi’s move to credit the opponent with genuine intent requires the capacity to tolerate abuse (as in instances where the opponent has, in fact, acted in bad faith) and to exercise forbearance. Gandhi once said that “impatience is a phase of violence”. In duragraha, efforts on the part of the opponent are oftentimes flaunted because they may upset the timetable of planned demonstration and result in inconvenience to the demonstrators. At such times the opponent is especially
likely to be suspect. The manner in which the duragrahi readily places demonstration at the top of his priorities, even at the cost of resolving the immediate conflict, is illustrated by many of the student demonstrations organized in support of the civil rights movement in the United States. The author witnessed one such demonstration in a university city. A civil rights group, largely made up of students, challenged merchants to include non-white employees in proportion to the city’s non-white population. After serious consideration the merchants did, in fact, take steps towards the integration of their employees and moved through the city’s welfare commission to set up a training program for potential employees from the minority group. Nevertheless, demonstrations and picketing were launched. When asked why they persisted in demonstrating even though the merchants had taken steps toward the desired objective, the leader of the demonstrators replied that the merchants had not acted in good faith, that their proposals were empty promises, and their hiring of a few Negroes amounted only to “tokenism”. In this instance there was considerable evidence that the merchants had, indeed, acted in good faith. To announce that the opponent was not acting in good faith could result only in bitterness and further conflict. One of the results in this case was the alienation of many townspeople who had initially supported the movement and who were potential supporters of all civil rights efforts.

The demonstration in question illustrates these two characteristics of duragraha—failure to accept the opponent’s moves as being taken in good faith, and taking action according to the convenience of the demonstrators. The timing of this demonstration had been scheduled for Christmas week. Students had a holiday during these days and were free to demonstrate and picket. An even more important consideration was the business loss merchants would incur through interference with Christmas shopping. Paralleling these considerations was the suspicion that the merchants would do anything to prevent disruption of business during this most profitable season. The allegation that the merchants were acting in bad faith was conditioned by and to some extent arose out of this suspicion.

In the incident cited above, the demonstrators were of the opinion that they were using Gandhian tactics. Any familiarity with Gandhian satyagraha would have precluded this misjudgement. Indians will remember well the occasions upon which Gandhi refrained from taking action against opponents when inconvenience
to the opponent was evident. He would not allow a movement aimed directly at Englishmen to continue during Easter Sunday and, out of respect for his opponent’s susceptibility to tropical heat, he would call off action during the hottest hours of the day. It would have been in the Gandhian spirit had these student demonstrators (1) taken the merchants' proposals as a genuine indication of their intention, (2) explained to the merchants that, even though their demands had not been met in full, they would withdraw their pickets during the important Christmas week so that business would not be unduly hurt, and (3) turned their efforts into solving the problems of organizing a training program to provide skilled workers from the non-white community.

III. The Limits Of Symbolic Violence
Those who lead movements aimed at effecting change have a choice of means, and in the storehouse of strategies symbolic violence ranks high in popularity. There is no denying that all forms of violence have some chance of success in securing immediate, well-defined objectives. Symbolic violence, as a form of violence, and duragraha as a form of symbolic violence share this potential for success. We have seen above how satyagraha, as contrasted to duragraha, has superior potential in situations of conflict in which fundamental changes of attitude and behaviour constitute the objective. A concluding word may be said about the nature of duragraha as symbolic violence and the limitations inherent in its use.

“Symbolic” pertains to something that denotes or stands for something else. The distinction should be made between, on the one hand, that which stands for something else because it has been given consciously a conventional or contrived significance and, on the other hand, that which represents an unconscious wish (in this case, to be violent), a counter-desire (in this case, to be nonviolent), or both at once. Those who consciously set out with violent intent and destructive objective to prosecute their action through means which are not physically violent may be said to engage in symbolic violence in the first sense—their nonviolent acts have the contrived significance of violence once-removed. Those who, on the other hand, are attached to the ideals of nonviolence while at the same time they unwittingly engage in destructive acts, may be involved in symbolic violence described in the second (psychoanalytic) meaning of “symbolic”.
The individual who uses symbolic violence but who believes that he is using no violence may be unaware of the substitute nature of his behaviour which, in its unconscious meaning, is violent and destructive. The behaviour of those who consciously contrive to use symbolic violence, as well as those who believe their actions to be free from violence, may both be substitutive in nature. The manner in which the guilt of others is used to promote a “nonviolent” movement, as illustrated above (in section II), can be better understood by applying this second meaning of “symbolic”.

The destructive effects of violence are widely recognized, and it is readily conceded that these effects extend beyond the physical. Violence once-removed, through unconscious symbolization, and acted upon in ways which exclude the cruder physical forms of destruction may indeed be more treacherous than frank and open violence.

The use of a symbol, if the results are to be understood (to say nothing of controlled), requires a high degree of awareness. Those who consciously set out to apply symbolic violence have a better chance of control and effectiveness than those who proceed with forms of duragraha without the recognition that they are involved in violence-once-removed. It is for this reason that the leader who would organize a movement without violence should be pressed to understand his techniques and to explore his strategies.

Wherever men meet to consider how they shall struggle against great odds for freedoms or for cherished rights, the name of Gandhi readily comes to their lips, and his image of greatness and success strengthens their will. Let them know the distinctions between Gandhian satyagraha and forms of struggle which are here described as duragraha. For without this understanding, the seminal contribution of Gandhi could be lost.

For those who do understand the many ways in which satyagraha is distinguished, a challenge is posed: the methods must be refined and techniques developed for this age of advanced technology. The Gandhian philosophy of conflict is sound. Who is to press forward the experiments in technique? The first step is to reject the falsity and failure which inhere in duragraha. New strategies for the constructive conduct of conflict, building upon and advancing beyond satyagraha, can be designed, and techniques to implement them await invention. In the face of
unparalleled risk, there are few challenges which present such scope for creativity, and perhaps none holds out so much promise.

References

1. Satyagraha, as a word coined to describe the technique Gandhi first used in South Africa and continued to develop in India, is readily understood to mean the Gandhian method of conducting conflict without violence. The word satyagraha is a compound of two Sanskrit nouns: satya, “truth” (from sat, “being”, with a suffix-yā) and agraha, “firm grasping” (a noun made from the verb agrah, which is the root grah, “seize, grasp”, with the verbal prefix a, “to, towards”). Duragraha is infrequently used in the sense of social action. The prefix dur (used in compound for dus) denotes “difficult”. One meaning of duragraha is “bias”. I am introducing the word here not only to enable the discussion at hand, but also to promote the refinement of language in describing techniques of social action. Many so-called satyagraha campaigns could more accurately be described as duragraha. The usefulness of the word in this context will become clear as the text progresses.


3. Quoted from Samuel Beer, *The City of Reason* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1949), p. 42. Professor Beer develops “the philosophical ideas which support the theory of a free society”, and a political theory derived from Whitehead’s metaphysic “based on reason and directed toward liberty”. The philosophy on which his form of ethics is based “emphasizes the relativity of all institutions… the gulf between the ideal and the actual is never bridged, although the duty of man is continually to try to bridge it”.


5. *Young India*, 7 June 1920.
